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The objective of this paper is to understand the image of the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 
2020 from a constructivist perspective. It aims to provide insights on how ‘war’ can be a 
subject constructed by norms and meanings. More specifically, we pay attention on the 
role of the Internet and social media platforms in constructing the war image. This 
research conducts a discourse analysis within Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical framework 
of discourse. By deconstructing the storylines from government officials, think tanks and 
social communities through official websites, Twitter and Facebook, we are able to form 
the narratives of both sides which present the overall image of this war. The result 
illustrates that the narratives of both sides are contradicting with each other based on their 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Research Problem- The Image of the Nagorno-Karabakh War 
 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the South Caucasus, featuring the rivalry between 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis1, has been considered as one of the most difficult conflicts 
to solve nowadays. It is a conflict with both complicated internal matters and geopolitical 
matters that are pulling bigger regional powers into the picture. The conflict involves 
debates ranging from historical and cultural legacies to the topics of self-determination 
and territorial integrity. While Armenians and Azerbaijanis are considered to be the 
mainly involved parties, Russia, Turkey and Iran are often considered by scholars as the 
regional players in the conflict. This variety of challenges led to a deadlock of the conflict 
with little effective third-party mediation. In 2020, we witnessed an escalation of the 
conflict in autumn, when both sides accused each other for the provocation of the war. 
Yet, this war had a new face when compared to the past. The available resources and tools 
in this digital era allowed parties from both sides to tell their part of the story to the world. 
By making use of the newly available empirical data, the objective of this paper is to 
understand the image of the Nagorno-Karabakh war constructed by Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis in 2020. 
 
The war in 2020 is one of the examples of the emerging ‘Internet Wars’ in this digital era, 
when the Internet becomes the virtual battlefield of the war besides the actual military 
attacks launched. This study is approached by conducting a discourse analysis on the 
storylines presented to the world by both parties. Discourses from officials, think tanks 
and social communities of both sides are studied. By conducting a discourse analysis, we 
are able to deconstruct their discourses and understand the messages underneath. It 
enables us to identify the storylines from both sides. These storylines are parts of the 
narratives that the parties wish to tell the world. Thus, by understanding their storylines, 
 
1 For the coherence of the paper, ‘Armenians’ and ‘Azerbaijanis’ are written in this order throughout the entire 




we are able to conclude their narratives. According to constructivism, these narratives 
construct the image of war the participants wish to present to the world.  
 
As such, this paper could be important to provide references and insights on how 
discourses are constituted nowadays with the prevalence of social media or the Internet 
in general. On social media platforms, participants are allowed to engage and tell their 
storylines by utilising a variety of functions, such as attaching different resources to 
support their arguments with hyperlinks or resharing others’ posts. Compared to the past 
when it often took a significant amount of time for knowledge and meanings to be 
transferred, interpreted and evolved, this process is speeded up by the available and handy 
communicative functions on social media nowadays. In addition to this, understanding 
the war image presented by participants from both sides allows researchers and policy 
makers to open another pathway to understand the meaning of war in the contemporary 
era. More specifically, this paper could possibly be able to provide an understanding on 
how ‘war’ could be a constructed concept.  
 
The following explains the structure of this paper. With the research problem stated above, 
this chapter (chapter 1), the introductory part of this paper will be continued by an 
overview of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It will provide a brief explanation of the 
history and the complicated political matters involved in this conflict. Chapter 2 will 
explain the theoretical framework of studying war images. This chapter will start off by 
providing the readers a literature review of both the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the 
constructivist framework on studying war images. Then it will be continued by the author 
of this paper explaining the theory of discourse selected, in light of the theoretical 
framework applied in this paper. The paper will then proceed to the methodological 
chapter of this research (chapter 3), which will include an explanation on the empirical 
data collection and the overall structure of the analysis. Chapter 4 and 5 are the empirical 
chapters where in-depth analysis from the Armenian side and the Azerbaijani side will be 
written respectively. Each of these two chapters include three subchapters, presenting the 
three narratives from each side. The paper will be finally concluded by chapter 6 with a 
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1.2 Overview of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict  
 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict mainly involves two nations in the South Caucasus, i.e. 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh region is a region internationally recognised 
as a part of the Azerbaijnai territory. Yet, the region is heavily inhabited by ethnic 
Armenians. It is neighboured by Armenia with seven surrounding districts occupied by 
Armenian forces before the war in 2020, which were considered by Armenia as buffer 
zones for security reasons. The region is also governed by a de facto government Republic 
of Artsakh.  
 
There are still controversies over the history of the conflict. It could possibly date back to 
a thousand years ago. The tensions were intensified by the Russo-Turkish power struggle 
in the 19th century. When Russia was in control of the region, Armenians were favoured 
by Russia while Azerbaijanis were considered to be untrustworthy due to its linguistic 
affinities shared with the Turks (Cornell, 1999). Similarly, Armenians were untrusted by 
the Turks. The national hatredness has been growing from that point. 
 
The noticeable rivalry between Armenians and the Turks (including the Turkic 
Azerbaijanis) was unveiled in the early 20th century. There was a widely recognised 
murder of Armenians committed by the Ottoman Empire during WWI. It is considered to 
be a genocide among Armenians but such genocide has been denied by Turkey. 
 
The First Karabakh War 
 
While the conflict has a long history that could date back to earlier ages, the first Karabakh 
war officially started in 1988 when everything else of the USSR was also falling apart. 
During the Soviet period, the minority enclave inhabited by Armenians within the 
territory of Azerbaijan was established as an autonomous oblast (Britannica, 2020). When 
the Soviet period was collapsing, the fear of being ethnically cleansed by Azerbaijan 
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marked the movements of Armenians (Cornell, 1999). The movement of Armenians 
aiming for unifying Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia was also a result of the 
demonstrations during the Glasnost period, when movements typically escalated from an 
ecological level to a political level (Cornell, 1999). These movements led to the 
parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) voting to unify with 
Armenia. Yet, things turned violent later with ethnic cleansing from both sides against 
the nationals of each other. Since 1993, seven districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh 
have been occupied by the Armenia forces as security zones surrounding the Nagorno-
Karabakh region. The districts were retaken by the Azerbaijani forces during the war in 
2020. 
 
The ceasefire agreement of the First Karabakh War was signed in 1994, brokered by 
Russia. As a result of this war, there were a large number of refugees and internally 
displaced persons from both sides. Yet, with the support from Armenia, the Armenians 
in Nagano-Karabakh gained political control of the region and the surrounding districts. 
 
Karabakh War in 2020 
 
After 1994, there were also constant clashes along the frontline between the two forces 
with military servicemen being killed. In 2020, it was escalated into a war in which a 
massive number of civilian casualties were reported by both sides. 
 
27th September 2020 was the mostly recognised starting date of war in 2020 because of 
the attacks reported by both sides. There were multiple attempts of ceasefire deals but all 
failed as clashes continued and both sides accused each other of being the offensive. The 
war lasted till the 9th November when both sides finally signed a truce brokered by Russia. 
As the result of this war, Azerbaijan regained the control of the territory including the 
second largest city, i.e. Shusha and the seven districts which were under the control of 
Armenia before the war. 
 
The war in 2020 ended in November when both parties came to a ceasefire brokered by 
Russia. Yet, the conflict remains uncertain in the future due to its complicated nature both 
internally and geopolitically. The Karabakh War in 2020 featured an ‘Internet war’ on 
social media platforms. Clashes between the two sides were observable on the Internet. 
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There were also occasions of false claims of attacks from both sides by posting photos 




One of the biggest controversies is the historical accuracy of the facts available about the 
region. Both Armenians and Turks had inhabited the region as an ethnic majority 
respectively in different time periods. Thus, this region has both Christian and Muslim 
heritages which Armenians and Azerbaijanis nowadays claim as the evidence of them 
being the ethnic origin of Nagorno-Karabakh. Such complicated ethnic history of the 
region can also be told by the name ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’, as it contains meanings 
stemming from Persian, Turkish and Russian linguistics (Cornell, 1999). 
 
Complications of the Conflict  
 
The internal issues of both nations, the ethnic and religious hatredness stemmed from 
history have complicated the conflict. Most importantly, one of the complications of this 
conflict lies in the fact that it involves two de jure states and an unrecognised republic 
(Cornell, 1999).  
 
Besides, while the conflict mainly involves the two South Caucusian nations, it is always 
viewed as a regional conflict since the power struggle between bigger regional powers 
such as Russia and Turkey is concerned. Even Iran is also sometimes considered as a 
party due to its strategic relationship with the South Caucasus. Although Russia has been 
the broker of ceasefire, it has been suspected that Russia attempts to remain both nations 
under its control by being the main supplier of arms to both countries (International Crisis 
Group, 2017).  
 
On the other hand, Turkey has been suspected to be actively involved in the conflict. 
While the introduction of Turkish military equipment by the Azerbaijnai forces could not 
possibly provide concrete evidence of Turkey intervening in the war in 2020, the public 
statement from the Turkish government on politically supporting Azerbaijan has 
undeniably illustrated its interest in the South Caucasus. While the current political 
relationship between Russia and Turkey remains seemingly stable, both of them are 
 9 
asserting influence in the South Caucasus and attempting to keep the power of each other 
in check. 
 
Mediation by Third Parties 
 
Mediation by third parties has been initiated on various occasions. Nonetheless, mediators 
are often mistrusted by both parties as they suspect the interests of the mediators and their 
ability to ensure stability in the region (International Crisis Group, 2017). Therefore, the 
international community has never been keen on dealing with this conflict. They have 
been “half-hearted at best and exiguous at worst” (Cornell, 1999, p.1) when it comes to 
mediation. Needless to mention, there are difficulties in third-party mediation also 
because of the respective national interests in the international community.  
 
The current third-party mediation of the conflict mainly relies on the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by the US, Russia 
and France. Out of the three countries, Russia, is the most active in mediating the conflict 
by brokering truces for both wars in the late 90s and 2020. For the US, this conflict might 
not have been much of its national interest, considering the South Caucasus has always 
been under the political influence of the regional powers. It was especially true in 2020 
with the US foreign policy under Trump’s administration. The stance of France on the 
issue has been highly suspected by Azerbaijan during the war in 2020, with Macron’s 
public statement of supporting Armenia, at least at a rhetorical level.  
 
The future of Nagorno-Karabakh is still ambiguous due to the unresolved complicated 
nature of the conflict and the struggle of geopolitical power involved. The lack of interests 









2. Understanding War Image through Constructivism 
 
2.1 Literature Review on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 
 
Since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has a long history with complicated political 
matters involved, it has been widely studied in the scholarship. Because of the internal 
and external matters involved, literature about this conflict has attempted to explain and 
interpret this conflict from various angles.  
 
There is a considerable amount of literature studying this conflict in light of geopolitics. 
This conflict has been analysed as the power struggle of regional powers. Overall, when 
it is viewed under the light of geopolitics, it is often considered as a conflict under the 
power struggle of Turkey and Russia, this includes studies such as Companjen (2010), 
Baba & Önsoy, (2016) and Warhola & Bezci (2013). In fact, many of the studies have 
also included energy concerns in their analysis. Turkey is one of the focuses in these 
studies, such as the study conducted by Winrow (2013). Mohapatra (2017) suggests the 
concerns of geopolitics and energy security have become more important in the field of 
international relations nowadays.  
 
The studies mentioned above focus more on the external matters of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. While for internal matters, the conflict is often studied in the light of 
ethnic struggles and disputes. Some literature put the focus on the matter of independence 
of Nagorno-Karabakh. This topic has been more often discussed since the case of Kosovo, 
which is suggested to be a trigger of the trend of self-determination in different parts of 
the world. Secession of Nagorno-Karabakh is considered to be an internal power struggle 
that is subject to the calculation of available resources and international norms (Caspersen, 
2013). Besides, their secession issue is believed to be complicated by ethnic struggles 
(Geukjian, 2016). There are also studies analysing the conflict in light of liberalism, 
suggesting how the liberal world order leads to the socialisation of non-state actors who 
advocate democratic values (Gardner, 2008). Overall, they suggest the internal matters of 
this conflict are difficult to solve due to the ineffective external help and mediations. 
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It is noticeable that some studies are conducted based on certain political interests. At the 
same time, there are studies particularly focusing on one party of the conflict when it 
comes to analysis. Although there have already been a significant amount of literature on 
this conflict, since the method of communication and the theories of international 
relations are constantly evolving, there is still a large room for interpreting this conflict 
and studying how this conflict could reflect upon our understanding about international 
relations.  
 
2.2 The Constructivist Theory  
 
As mentioned, this research aims at understanding international relations from a 
constructivist perspective. The following will explain how the research problem of this 
paper is related to constructivism and how war image construction has been understood 
by scholars. 
 
2.2.1 Constructivism and International Relations 
 
Unlike realist arguments which suggest states are the main driving actors in international 
relations, constructivists emphasise the importance of knowledge, meanings and 
perceptions constructed through social interactions. Constructivism suggests that norms 
and practices constitute international relations. For example, diplomatic practices 
constitute our understanding about state capacities (Farrell, 2002). Norms and practices 
also constitute actors and actions and regulate them by defining the appropriateness with 
social rules (Farrell, 2002). In fact, constructivism suggests our world is overall a socially 
constructed reality where knowledge and meanings are flexible and being shaped 
continuously. To be precise, knowledge is not absolute. Guzzini (2005) argues that we 
live in an intersubjective reality because knowledge and meanings, though exist, are 
altered through our interaction and usage. Guzzini (2005) explains that: 
it is not subjective, since it exists independently of us to the extent that language is always 
more than its individual usages and prior to them. It is not objective, since it does not 
exist independently of our minds and our usage. (p.498) 
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Constructivism has become popular in the academic field as scholars have been 
identifying limitations that the traditional schools fail to overcome.  
 
2.2.2 Literature Review on War Image Construction 
 
The understanding of war has been evolving. In light of the constructivist perspective, we 
could also understand war as a constructed subject. When we consider war as a 
constructed subject, we are suggesting that there is an image of war which is made up by 
norms and meanings. To be precise, it is the narratives told that construct the image. With 
the narratives from each side of the war, the image of the war becomes apparent. “While 
we have become accustomed to think in terms of national enemies, the truth is that a 
nation cannot hate, only citizens can” (Houten, 2013, p.6). According to Houten (2013), 
national enmity is a collective concept. In other words, it is people’s perspectives that 
construct what national enemies mean to them. Similarly, it would be people’s 
perspectives that construct the image of war.  
 
In fact, studying the construction of war images is not something new in the academic 
field. The construction of war images is often studied by conducting a discourse analysis 
(O ́Tuathail, 2002; Montgomery, 2005; O ́Tuathail 2008; Steuter & Wills, 2009; Hodges, 
2011) or a visual framing analysis (Griffin & Lee, 1995; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; 
Makhortykh & Sydorova, 2017) depending on the empirical data the authors attempted 
to analyse. Discourse analysis is conducted for analysing textual empirical sources in 
speeches, interviews, and news channels while visual framing analysis is applied to 
analysing images, photos and pictures published on visual mediums.  
 
Regardless of the research methods on war image construction, media representation of 
wars has been widely discussed. It has always been criticised as biased and promoting 
escalation of wars (Griffin & Lee, 1995; Kempf, 2006). Media is often selective on the 
sources when they present them to the world. Tuchmann (1978), Herman and Chomsky 
(1988) suggest that media content is never independent from political, social and 
ideological influence, as cited by Fahmy and Kim (2008). For instance, they might put 
emphasis on certain issues and let people use the resources they put out for discussion 
and interpretation, according to Tuchman (1978) as stated by Fahmy and Kim (2008).  
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In recent years, communication has become more convenient on the Internet. The 
consumption of news by individuals through social media platforms has been increasing. 
According to Biały (2017), the Pew Research Center conducted a survey in 2016 with a 
result showing that 62% of US citizens read news from social media platforms, regardless 
of the variation in frequency. It illustrates the significance of the role of social media on 
spreading information and knowledge. As such, storylines could be told through different 
media channels, having different levels of participants engaging in their storytelling. 
Social media has become an indispensable medium for storylines to be created, told, 
interpreted and made use of. As such, social media has become an important non-state 
actor to construct norms in our world. It also opens up the opportunities for both the 
bottom-level participants to express their opinions and the opportunities for researchers 
to conduct analysis on the content posted online.  
 
Undoubtedly, the role of social media in spreading information and shaping politics has 
been widely recognised. For instance, the conflicts in Ukraine and Middle East have 
demonstrated how social media maximise military operations such as intelligence 
collection and cyber warfare (Biały, 2017). The Ukrainian Crisis has also been studied by 
Makhortykh and Sydorova (2017). According to Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010), as cited 
by Makhortykh and Sydorova (2017), war has been connected by different levels of 
participants in a way that was impossible before the Internet era. Yet, Makhortykh and 
Sydorova (2017) also suggests that such phenomenon makes patterns of war framing 
become more difficult to predict. 
 
Since there is the difficulty to predict war framing as mentioned by Makhortykh and 
Sydorova (2017) and that currently there is still inadequate research on the effect of 
discourse on social media, it is believed that a study conducted on social media would be 
beneficial to enhance our understanding of war and international relations in the 
contemporary era. 
 
Empirical wise, while there is a wealthy amount of research conducted on the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict as mentioned in the previous section, there has not yet been adequate 
discourse analysis conducted on the narratives presented by the two conflict parties. The 
conflict escalation in 2020 with the utilisation of media platforms by different levels of 
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participants creates an opportunity for a discourse analysis that allows us to understand 
the construction of the war image. 
 
2.3 War Image and Discourse Analysis 
 
Understanding how people perceive is significant for understanding how a war is 
constructed. In order to understand their perception, the most practical way would be 
studying the meanings they present to the world. Discourse analysis is the best tool to 
achieve this goal.  
 
2.3.1 The Discourse Theories 
 
The following explains why discourse analysis should be applied in this research and 
which discourse theoretical framework is applicable for this empirical case. The detailed 
research design based on the chosen method of discourse analysis will be explained in the 
chapter of methodology. 
 
Discourse analysis is often applied when we attempt to understand the world through a 
constructivist perspective. Discourse analysis holds the assumption that norms in our 
society are given birth by discursive practices and representations are fundamental for 
understanding our reality (Holzschieter, 2014). Taking language as the fundamental 
access to our reality, discourse emphasises the shaping process of meanings is achieved 
with the representations created by the usage of language (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). 
At the same time, these representations themselves are also contributing to the 
construction of reality (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Thus, discourse analysis has become 
a common tool in constructivist research. 
 
There are various types of discourses analysis, with Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse 
Theory and Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) being the most renowned in 
the field. Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory is a post-structuralist perspective which 
holds assumption that our objective world is made up by discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2002). Besides, it also emphasises discourses are constantly competing and conflicting 
with each other on significations and none of the discourses can solely structure the social 
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reality (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). However, it is also important to note that their theory 
does not reject the independent existence of facts or events in our world but emphasises 
how meanings can be generated and understood just through our discourses (Dabirimehr 
& Fatmi, 2014). 
 
On the other hand, Fairclough’s CDA emphasises that our reality is not solely made up 
by discourses as discourses are also influenced by social practices (Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2002). These social practices include political culture and norms of that particular society. 
From Fairclough’s perspective, language is also being historically situated and involved 
in a dialectical relationship with different social aspects (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). 
Thus, Laclau and Mouffe’s approach and Fairclough’s CDA are located in different 
positions on the constructivist spectrum.  
 
By taking references from Kratochwil (2001) and Wendt (1999), Holzscheiter (2014) 
emphasises there is a distinction between the perspectives of thick and thin constructivism. 
In her article, she states that thick constructivism perceives norms and social facts as the 
sole elements constituting our realities. While for thin constructivism, she states that such 
norms and social facts are believed to be also possible to exist independently in 
individuals’ minds and are often considered to be one of the social logics constituting our 
realities. By citing Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), Rear and Jones (2013) suggests that 
while Laclau and Mouffe’s theory is located at the opposite end against the Marxist theory, 
Fairclough’s CDA would be located somewhere between them. In other words, Laclau 
and Mouffe’s approach is close to the thick constructivist framework suggested by 
Kratochwil and Wendt, while Fairclough’s approach is closer to the thin constructivist 
approach.  
 
2.3.2 The Applicability of Laclau and Mouffe’s Framework  
This research introduces a methodological design inspired by the theoretical framework 
of Laclau and Mouffe since this research holds the assumption which suggests the 
conflicting discourses from Armenians and Azerbaijanis constitute the image of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh war, i.e. the meaning of this war in our social reality. We believe that 
the image of this war is undoubtedly a constructed concept that is always contested by 
different discourses reflecting the struggles between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. This is 
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just as Laclau and Mouffe’s theory suggests, i.e. the social phenomena are constantly 
contested by different versions of definitions because of the existing social struggles 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).  
 
At the same time, we also believe that the narratives constituting the image of Nagorno-
Karabakh war in 2020 are the discursive representation of identities the two parties hold. 
In other words, the image of the war they present to the world reflects their identification 
of themselves regarding the war. In fact, according to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), 
Laclau has also adopted Jacques Lacan’s idea in the discourse theory, i.e. the subject is 
constantly being constructed through discourses. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) also states 
that in Lacan’s idea, discourses provide certain instructions for people to identify 
themselves with certain labels. In this research, we believe the discourses from both 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis provide criterion for the identification of the ‘self’ and 
‘other’. It implies that only certain qualities being fulfilled could be considered as the 
‘self’. These certain qualities could be identified from the discourses they produce. Thus, 
conducting the research within Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theoretical framework is 
reasonable as we believe there is otherness in their storylines that defines the narratives.  
 
Although it is commonly known that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse is 
considerably built on the post-structuralist theories by borrowing ideas from post-
structuralist philosophers such as Foucault, we believe their theory of discourse is also 
beneficial for this research. Post-structuralist perspectives emphasise that in order to 
understand certain phenomena, one has to study how such knowledge is produced. The 
epistemological approach of post-structuralists could help us understand the meanings of 
our words and why they are used. As such, it allows us to deconstruct the storylines 
participants present to the world, which is a crucial step for us to reconstruct the narratives 
that constitute the image of the war. 
 
While we also hold the belief that the discourses observed are also constituted by the 
political culture and social practices, understanding how such social practices contribute 
to the discursive practices is not one of the objectives of the paper. It would be irrelevant 
to the research question of this paper, i.e. the image of Nagorno-Karabakh war presented. 
Besides, taking social practices into account requires further analysis, which would be 
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out of the scope of this paper. Thus, Fairclough’s CDA is not applicable in this research. 
Nonetheless, we should not rule out the possibilities that certain phenomena could be 
observable among the discourses from different levels of participants within the same 
society. That is, for instance, how statements from government officials were being 
interpreted and reproduced by other participants. Yet, these observations could hardly be 
the sufficient evidence to point out the existence and influence of certain social practices 
in that society.  
 
Besides, it is important to note that while discourse analysis can be also applied in 
analysing individual identity, only collective identity from both sides are focused as it is 
believed that the storylines they produced were based on their collective identity, i.e. their 
national identities of being Armenians and Azerbaijanis respectively. 
 
Finally, while visual framing analysis has been particularly applied for analysing pictures 
and images presented by the media, this paper conducts a discourse analysis under which 
visual images are studied and analysed in the same way as textual content. We believe 
images and texts have the same discursive power in producing storylines in this empirical 
case. It is also explained by Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) that visual images are commonly 


















3. Methodology  
 
This chapter is going to explain the methodology of the research. The analysis involves 
three main steps. Firstly, we will collect the empirical data. Secondly, we will deconstruct 
the storylines observed by applying Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to discourse. In order 
to do this, we will deconstruct the discourse the participants produced through the textual 
and visual content they uploaded. Thirdly, we will reconstruct their storylines into 
narratives and present them in this paper. As a result of reconstruction, these narratives 
from both sides are believed to be presenting the image of this war. The narratives from 




The following explains the key terms applied in the analysis. 
 
War image- War image is the meaning of the war in our social reality. ‘Nagorno-
Karabakh war in 2020’ is regarded as a floating signifier in this research, the meaning of 
which will be explained in the following. The signified content of this ‘war’ is contested 
by the narratives presented by each side of the conflict. 
 
Narratives- Narratives present the image of war. We assume the narratives from the two 
sides are conflicting with each other. We assume that all of the narratives from each side 
are surrounded by the same ideology respectively, such as ‘democracy’. The ideologies 
supporting the narratives are considered to be the central signifiers, which will be 
explained in the following.  
 
Storylines- Storylines are what we deconstruct and attempt to understand in this research 
through discourse analysis of the empirical data collected. Narratives presented in this 
paper are constituted by the deconstructed storylines told by different levels of 
participants from each party. 
 
Signifiers- According to Dabirimehr and Fatmi (2014), signifiers in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
theory of discourse are “abstract or real entities, concepts, phrases, and symbols. If they 
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are located in a particular discourse, they will imply some specific meanings. Meaning 
and implications of a signifier are called signified ”(p. 1284). The meaning of signifiers 
and signified content as explained by the quote will also be applied in this research.  
 
Central signifiers- A central signifier in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory is suggested to “a 
person, symbol, or concept around which other signifiers are collected and articulated” 
(Dabirimehr & Fatmi, 2014, p.1284). In other words, the signified content of other 
signifiers is assigned according to these central signifiers.  
 
Floating signifiers- According to Dabirimehr and Fatmi (2014), the signified content of 
floating signifiers can never be fixed due to how different political parties attempt to 
provide their own meanings to the terms. In this research, for instance, the Nagorno-
Karabakh war is a floating signifier as different groups of people were trying to assign 
and fix the signified content of this signifier in accordance with their wish and belief.  
 
3.2 Data Collection 
 
Since this research aims at understanding the image constructed and presented to the 
world, only English materials published and posted via media by both sides will be 
analysed. Besides, the research only looks at the content released during the period from 
the 27th September 2020 (the start of the 2020 war) to the 18th October 2020 (The day 
after the announcement of the first ceasefire). It is believed that the storylines told within 
these three weeks is sufficient for the deconstruction and the analysis of the hidden 
messages about the war. The materials studied in this paper includes the hyperlinks 
attached by the posts or the articles released if there are any. 
 
The image of the Nagorno-Karabakh war is constructed by conflicting discourses. These 
conflicting discourses came from the two opposing sides involved in the war, i.e. 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis. At the same time, there were various levels of participants 
from each side producing their own discourses. In this research, we will study the 
discourses produced by different levels of participants from the top level (elites) to the 
bottom level (general public) within a society respectively. In this methodological design, 
participants from the two sides are categorised into three levels: 
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1) Government officials and elites  
2) Think tanks (experts and scholars) 
3) Social communities 
 
Data from all the three levels will be collected via social media platforms (Facebook and 
Twitter2) while traditional media is also observed for the data from the levels of officials 
and think thanks. Among all the social media platforms, Twitter and Facebook are two of 
the most popular platforms used around the world. Twitter is a platform more suitable for 
celebrities or important figures to establish their personal profiles. Therefore, it is 
believed that Twitter is a better platform for data collection from individual figures. On 
the other hand, unlike Twitter, Facebook allows individuals from the communities to form 
groups on the platform and run the Facebook pages. Besides, Facebook allows users to 
write longer posts than Twitter. It is believed that the better networking functions of 
Facebook allow more people to engage themselves in the social communities and express 
their thoughts.  
 
In the following, data collection from each level of participants will be explained in 
detail.  
 
Government officials and elites  
 
For the level of officials, Twitter accounts of government officials and the content 
released by the news agencies will be analysed. During the set time frame for observation, 
government officials from both sides of the conflict were active on Twitter by posting 
statements, announcements and related interviews that supported the stance of the 
government. At the same time, news agencies actively released news updates of the war 
and the actions taken from both parties.  
 
 
2 Although posts on Twitter are commonly known as ‘tweets’, all the posts from social media platforms, including 
both Twitter and Facebook, are all referred to ‘posts’ in this paper for coherence. 
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From the Armenian side, the content and materials released from the Twitter accounts of 
Nikol Pashinyan (Prime Minister of Armenia) and Armen Sarkissian (President of 
Armenia) will be studied. While from the Azerbaijani side, the Twitter account of Ilham 
Aliyev (President of Azerbaijan) will be studied. The content studied includes the 
hyperlinks and media attached with the Twitter posts. This selection of elites is based on 
the political institutions of the countries. In Armenia, it is observed that there is a clearer 
distribution of duties between the head of state (President) and the head of government 
(Prime Minister). On the other hand, this distribution of duty is ambiguous in Azerbaijan. 
Besides, Pashinyan and Aliyev were the representatives to sign the ceasefire truce of the 
war in 2020. Thus, we believe that Pashinyan, although not being the head of state, also 
has had a very important and active role on the Nagorno-Karabakh issues. 
 
The content released by news agencies is considered to be discourses from the level of 
officials as they support the government’s stance and points of view. All the data from 
news agencies will be collected from their official websites. For the Armenian side, the 
content released by Armenpress will be studied and analysed. Armenpress is a leading 
state-run news agency in Armenia. The agency is aiming at countering Azerbaijani 
propaganda and drawing international attention to Turkey’s denial of Armenian genocide 
(Armenpress, n.d.). While for the Azerbaijani side, this research studies the content 
released by Azertag, News.Az and AzerNews during the set time frame for observation. 
According to the information and missions written on their websites, there are some 
differences among these three news agencies. Azertag is the only news agency that 
releases official government news (Azertag, n.d.). News.Az claims to be a private news 
agency with the aim of enhancing awareness of the international community about 
Azerbaijan (News.Az, n.d.). For AzerNews, it claims to be the first English news agency 
in Azerbaijan that has joined the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers 
(WAN-IFRA) (AzerNews, 2012). Yet, all the three Azerbaijani news agencies have the 
same objective and mission, i.e. enhance the awareness of the world about Azerbaijan. 




For the level of think tanks, not only the materials released officially from the websites 
of the organizations will be studied. The research will also look into the Twitter accounts 
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of the key spokespersons of the respective think tanks. Here is the list of think tanks that 
will be studied.  
 
For the Armenian side: 
 
Armenian Centre for National and International Studies (ACNIS)- It is a renowned think 
tank of national and international politics in Armenia that is based in Yerevan. According 
to their mission, one of their aims is to promote the pan-national discourses in Armenia 
(ACNIS, n.d.). The editorials and weekly updates released during the set time frame will 
be studied.  
 
Regional Studies Center (RSC)- It is another renowned think tank based in Armenia and 
famous for regional politics and strategic analysis surrounding the South Caucasus (RSC, 
n.d.). Nonetheless, the official website of the think tank did not release any relevant data 
during the observed time frame. Thus, instead of the official website, the content and 
materials released by the Twitter account of the director of the think tank, i.e. Richard 
Giragosian, will be studied.  
 
For the Azerbaijani side: 
 
Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)- This think tank was 
established by President Aliyev in 2019. It is the main political think tank in the country 
conducting analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The content released both by the 
official website and the Twitter account of the board member Gulshan Pashayeva during 
the observed time frame will be studied. 
 
Social Communities  
 
Data from the level of social communities will be collected through Facebook posts 
written by Facebook users from both sides during the observed time frame. In order to 
collect relevant data for analysis, the author of this paper will utilise the Facebook 
searching engine by searching relevant posts through specific hashtags. The chosen 
hashtags have a very high popularity in usage. On average, each of the hashtags has been 
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applied in approximately 50K posts. Facebook posts that contain the following hashtags 
will be studied in this research.  
 












Although social communities are generally interactive by engaging in conversations 
through the replies in the comment sections, these comments are not a part of the 
empirical data of this research. Only the Facebook posts, written as a single and a new 
post or status are considered as a part of the empirical data for this research. We believe 
studying these Facebook posts is adequate to understand their storylines. 
 






As such, the narratives will be constituted with the storylines presented by these three 
levels of participants.  
 
3.3 Expectations From the Analysis 
 
By learning the conflict background in general, it is assumed that Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis produced conflicting narratives based on their beliefs of the history of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, how ‘territory’ should be defined and who were the offensive party 
that provoked the war. In other words, we assume there is a contradictory perception of 
the ‘self’ when compared to the ‘other’ described by the opposing side. 
 
Besides, we assume the central signifiers are consistent among the narratives presented 
in this paper for both the Armenian side and the Azerbaijani side respectively. It is 
because we believe that all the storylines they told are based on their central beliefs. These 
central beliefs are assumed to be defining their identity and the values they embrace.  
 
We also assume that their discourses were consumed and reproduced at the same time. 
The logic behind is the reflexive nature of constructed realities, as mentioned by Guzzini 
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(2005), where meanings are both consumed and produced simultaneously. It is assumed 
that different levels of participants were interactive in building their storylines. We expect 
to see this manifested in the form of, for instance, reshares of content released by other 
levels of participants through hyperlinks. 
 
3.4  Structure of the Analysis 
 
For the emprical part of this paper, the narratives of Armenians will be presented first 
(chapter 4), followed by the narratives of Azerbaijanis (chapter 5). The data collected will 
be deconstructed and analysed. Then, they will be reconstructed into different narratives 
by the author of this paper. Each narrative portrays a version of the war image that the 
participants wished to present to the world. The whole image of war is constituted by the 
contested narratives. 
 
As the result of the research, there are three narratives from each side of the war. 
 
The narratives from the Armenian side: 
1. Genocide 2.0 
2. Patriotic War 
3. War on Western and Christian Values  
 
The narratives from the Azerbaijani side: 
1. Armenian Terrorism 
2. Liberation of ‘Self’ 








4. Armenian Narratives 
 
4.1 Genocide 2.0 
 
The narrative of this war as the second genocidal attempt committed by the Turks was 
prevalent among all the levels of participants from the Armenian side. In this narrative, 
although Azerbaijan was still the aggressor in the war, it was Turkey being portrayed as 
the main enemy. It illustrated Turkey having its own expansionist agenda behind its 
intervention in the conflict. Turkey aims to rebuild its Ottoman Empire by expanding its 
influence and conquering territories of others. Armenian people were suffering from an 
existential threat because of Turkey’s genocidal policy carried out with Azerbaijan. 
Turkey had direct involvement in the war as the Azerbaijani military was backed and 
supported both politically and militarily by the Turkish government.  
 
“Existential Threat” of Armenians  
 
Different levels of participants portrayed this narrative by telling the world how Turkey 
has denied the genocide of 1.5 million Armenians committed in the last century. This war 
of Nagorno-Karabakh became Turkey’s second attempt of genocide through the hands of 
the Azerbaijani forces.  
 
At the level of officials, Pashinyan stated the intention of Turkey to commit a second 
genocide of Armenian people, with the aim of expanding its influence and territories. For 
multiple times, he used the word “existential threat” to describe the situation Armenian 
people were facing. In the interview with The Spectator (Komireddi, 2020), he said, “So 
far, Turkey has not only refused to recognise the fact of the Armenian genocide —Turkey 
is in fact continuing its genocidal policy towards the Armenians” (para. 14). On the other 
hand, according to Sarkissian, this second episode of genocide was carried out by Turkey 
through the hands of Azerbaijanis (Armenpress, 2020b). To explain how this war has 
become a genocide of Armenians, Pashinyan stated that an attack on Nagorno-Karabakh 
was an attack against the Armenian people because more than 80% of the population 
currently living there are ethnic Armenians (BBC News, 2020). In addition, in order to 
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illustrate the danger Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh were facing during the war, for 
instance, Pashinyan posted on Twitter about the destroyed homes in Martuni, a city in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region (Pashinyan, 2020c). 
 
At the level of social communities, most of the participants were telling the world how 
Turkey and Azerbaijan were the aggressors in the war, targeting innocent Armenian 
civilians. There were a number of posts illustrating how the Armenian nation was under 
the existential threat with innocent civilians being attacked by the Azerbaijani forces. For 
example, there were photos comparing the first genocide and this war by putting them 
side to side and combined them into a single picture (Rubenyan, 2020). Such display of 
photo showed the similarity of what happened in the first genocide and what was 
happening in this war. Besides, the following are some quotes from Facebook illustrating 
the existential threat of Armenians under the attacks. “Azerbaijan has just dropped a bomb 
on the Armenian Church in the city of Shushi, Republic of NagornoKarabakh (Artsakh). 
How else you define a genocide? Pure barbarism” (Garo, 2020, para. 1). “Artsakh needs 
our help as 100K Ethnic Armenian Christians flee to excape yet another genocide by 
Turkey” (Zetilyan, 2020, para.1). 
 
Moreover, the attacks against Stepanakert were often emphasised among the social 
communities. Photos of homes and family cars being destroyed were posted. Here are 
some of the quotes describing the attacks against Stepanakert. “Amnesty International 
confirms the usage of cluster munitions by the Azerbaijani armed forces backed by 
Turkey targeting civilian infrastructures and the Armenian population of Stepanakert, 
Capital of Artsakh NagornoKarabakh” (EAFJD, 2020, para. 1). “Stepanakert continues 
to be under fire. Civilian casualties are already confirmed. For the 8th day Azerbaijani 
and Turkish drones and air force target peaceful towns and civilian infrastructures” 
(Papoyan, 2020, para. 1). 
 
At the same time, the social communities asked for the attention from the international 
community on the existential threat of Armenians. “As many of you might already know, 
Armenia is going through hard times, trying to stand firm and fight for its right to live as 
a nation” (Little Singers of Armenia, 2020, para. 3). The post of Marcianò (2020) 
suggested that, “In Armenia and Artsakh, the artists who pave the way towards the 
collective healing of our communities are now required to become soldiers to protect their 
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families and neighbors” (para. 2). There was a clear message from these posts, which 
were asking the international community for their help to fight against the brutal ‘other’.  
 
Another reason it was considered as an existential threat to Armenians is because of the 
small-sized population of Armenia. The number of Armenian inhabitants living in 
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh is much smaller than the Armenian diaspora all over the 
world. The concern was also raised by Pashinyan and was more prevalently discussed by 
the social communities on Facebook. For example, according to Baghdassarian (2020), 
their brothers and friends were sent to the battlefield because of the full military 
mobilisation that came with the declaration of martial law. From such, it could be 
observed that Armenians were concerned of this war causing danger to their families and 
friends not just because of the attacks, but also because their loved ones were sent to the 
battlefield.  
 
Turkey’s Expansionist Policy 
 
The narrative of genocide 2.0 was backed by participants from different levels by 
providing evidence on Turkey’s intention to expand its influence and territories.  
 
Pashinyan expressed his concern about the Turkish expansionist policy multiple times. 
Particularly, in the interview with France 24 (2020), he suggested that Turkey will 
continue its expansionist policy after Armenia, just as how it has been doing in the Middle 
East and the Mediterranean Sea. Pashinyan said, “Armenia is the last obstacle in the way 
of Turkey and their expansion towards the north, and the east” (France 24, 2020, para. 3). 
In another interview with Russia Today (Sarkissian, 2020), Sarkissian rebutted Turkey’s 
claim of protecting Azerbaijanis from Armenians, who intended to heat the pipeline that 
connects Baku. According to him, this claim was unreasonable because Turkey could 
have stopped the pipeline from being built in earlier stages. Thus, it was suggested that 
Turkey’s interference in the conflict had a political intention behind it.  
 
At the level of think tanks, they also affirmed it was the expansionist policy of Turkey 
driving its decision to intervene in the conflict. Although it was not often explicitly 
emphasised that the war of Nagnorno-Karabakh was the second genocide committed by 
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Turkey, a direct political and military involvement of Turkey in the war was affirmed. By 
citing Los Angeles Review of Books (2020), ACNIS (2020f) affirmed that Nagorno-
Karabakh was being ethnically cleansed by Azerbaijan and Turkey with the Turkish 
expansionist agenda.  
 
Moreover, they expressed the concern of the war being escalated to a regional one, pulling 
other bigger powers, such as Russia, Iran and China into the picture. For instance, in the 
editorial article ACNIS (2020a), it was mentioned that the war has been transformed from 
one between Armenians and Azerbaijanis into one between Armenians and Turks. The 
article also stated how the general public underestimated the intention and 
unpredictability of Turkey in the past couple of decades. Furthermore, according to 
another article ACNIS (2020c), the actions taken by Turkey have reflected the rise of the 
imperial ideology Neo-Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism, which is a threat challenging the 
current world order. This article suggested that while it is certainly threatening the 
countries with geographical proximity with Turkey, it is particularly dangerous to small 
countries such as Armenia. Thus, Armenian as a small nation, became the first to suffer 
from this expansionist policy. In addition, the Armenian scholar Giragosian, the director 
of RSC, posted various articles he wrote about this conflict on Twitter during the time 
frame observed. He suggested that Turkish expansionism has become a regional struggle 
with the confrontation between the bigger powers, Russia and Turkey (Giragosian, 2020a; 
Giragosian, 2020b). Besides, in these articles, he also argued that this war has illustrated 
the possible instability in the South Caucasus and the Black Sea region.  
 
At the level of social communities, they were echoing the messages the other levels are 
expressing. They also suggested it was the Turkish expansionist agenda being involved 
and Azerbaijan’s policies being led by the Turkish administration. For example, in a post 
written by Marcianò (2020), it argued that “a war was started by Azerbaijan, under the 
military and political leadership of Turkey” (para. 1). In fact, there were many Facebook 
posts telling the world that Turkey was a terrorist. For instance, by listing the countries 
Turkey had problems with, Ohanian (2020) urged the world to recognise Turkey as a 
terrorist country since it had problems with every country. At the same time, the social 
communities directly accused Turkey of being the sponsor of ISIS in the region, who 
aimed to commit genocide on Armenians (Vahanyan, 2020). Azerbaijan was considered 
to be an ally of Turkey. Therefore, Azerbaijan was also considered as a terrorist country.  
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Moreover, in one of the posts (Gabyan, 2020), there was a video attached portraying the 
Turkish President Erdogan as the new ‘Hitler’ by giving him an alternative name 
‘Erdogitler’. The video attempted to draw the attention of the audience to look at the 
similarities of what happened in WWII and what was happening to the Armenian people 
in this war. In the same video, Aliyev was portrayed as the puppet under the control of 
the Turkish government. This post has been shared more than 8,000 times. There was 
another post putting Hitler and Erdogan’s pictures side to side, illustrating how much their 
faces looked alike (Hovhannes Switch Stepanyants, 2020). By portraying Erdogan as 
Hitler, it expressed a clear message to the world that the actions taken by Erdogan were 
equivalent to what Hitler did in the past. Besides, another post on Facebook (Avedikian, 
2020) described Erdogan as a ‘monster’. “Terrorist Erdogan is pouring oil on fire and 
destabilizing the region. The monster has officially bragged about it” (Avedikian, 2020, 
para. 1). Erdogan was not only considered as the new Hitler or a monster, but also a self-
identified Sultan. “It's the same goal that almost all Sultans had throughout the history of 
Turkey: make Istanbul the center of the world by conquering it” (Barseghyan, 2020, para. 
2). In the same post, it was also stated that, “Just take a look at the map. On the left is 
Turkey and on the right are all the nations that are related to Turkey ethnically. We 
Armenians are like a stick stuck on their throat” (Barseghyan, 2020, para. 1). On one hand, 
these posts described the war as a part of the terrorist policy of Turkey, they also clearly 
indicated the existential threat that Armenians were suffering under Turkey’s terrorist 
agenda. In addition, when looking at the Facebook posts through the particular hashtags 
picked for this research, it was noticeable that people also used other hashtags on the same 
posts. Although not as prevalent as the hashtags we studied for this research, hashtags 
such as “StopErdogan” and “StopGenocide” were also used in the posts studied. Such 
usage of hashtags, again, illustrated the storyline of Turkey being the evil ‘other’ who 
was committing a genocide against Armenians and that its actions had to be stopped. 
 
Turkey’s Military involvement  
 
Turkey’s military involvement in this narrative emphasised how history has been repeated. 
As suggested, participants argued that this war was the second genocide committed by 
Turkey. In fact, Turkey’s military involvement in this war became the supporting 
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evidence of their narrative about this war being the second genocide. Participants across 
the levels were telling the world how Turkey was directly intervening in the conflict with 
its military involvement. According to them, Turkish military equipment was being 
adopted by the Azerbaijani forces. The equipment employed included the F-16 combat 
aircraft and Turkish drones. Turkey was also accused of bringing Syrian militants to the 
battlefield.  
 
At the level of officials, Pashinyan pointed out in The Washington Post that the attacks 
launched by Azerbaijan against the Verdenis area with a Turkish F-16 shot down a S-25 
fighter from the Armenian side (Ignatius, 2020). Pashinyan also accused Turkey of 
bringing forces from the Middle East to Nagorno-Karabakh in a number of his Twitter 
posts during the observed time frame.  
 
Similarly, at the level of think tanks, ACNIS (2020b, 2020d) suggested the possibility of 
Turkey’s direct military involvement by citing articles written by different Western media 
channels e.g. New York Times and Forbes. This included Turkey recruiting Syrian 
refugees to the Nagorno-Karabakh battlefield and its provision of military equipment and 
training to the Azerbaijani forces. 
 
At the level of social communities, many of the posts were condemning the military 
involvement of Turkey. Their posts often echoed the officials, such as pointing out the 
employment of Turkish F-16 aircraft by the Azerbaijani forces. In general, the storyline 
on military involvement of Turkey from the social communities was consistent with other 
levels. Again, such argument about the Turkish military involvement became their 
evidence of their narrative, suggesting the history of genocide being repeated. 
 
Conclusion of the Narrative 
 
In the narrative of genocide 2.0, Armenians attempted to assign “genocide 2.0” as the 
signified content of this war. In this narrative, the war was considered to be the second 
genocide committed by the brutal ‘other’, i.e. Turkey, against the Armenian ‘self’, which 
was the victim of this war. In fact, the ‘self’ as a nation was emphasised. As mentioned, 
there were Armenians posting photos of the first genocide and compared them to what 
happened in this war. From this, we could observe how this war triggered the collective 
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memory of the ‘self’ as a victimised and traumatised nation. In other words, their 
collective identity in this narrative was a traumatised nation that was facing the existential 
threat repeatedly because of the brutal ‘other’. 
 
According to them, the followings are the evidence of this war being the second genocide. 
Firstly, Armenians witnessed their innocent civilians being killed. Secondly, they saw 
how Turkey had problems with various countries. They believed Turkey was intervening 
in this war in accordance with its expansionist agenda. Thirdly, they pointed out there 
was suspicious Turkish military involvement in the war, which included bringing 
international terrorists to the battlefield.  
 
For Azerbaijan, they were on the same side with Turkey, being the brutal ‘other’ against 
innocent Armenian civilians. Yet, it is important to note that Azerbaijan’s policies were 
driven by Turkey in this narrative. According to them, Azerbaijan was a puppet controlled 














4.2 Patriotic War 
 
This is a narrative where the ‘nation’ was emphasised. In this narrative, the war was a 
patriotic war to Armenians because Armenians around the world were fighting for the 
entire nation. Armenians in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and all over the world were one 
nation standing together. In this narrative, national unity across borders was the most 
important component of ‘self’. This ‘self’ had an ethnic liberation struggle because the 
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh could not unite with Armenia. This ethnic struggle 
could only be resolved through self-determination. With this national unity, the ‘self’ was 
strong enough to stand against the evil ‘other’, i.e. Turkey and Azerbaijan.  
 
This is a narrative mostly constructed by the officials and the social communities. The 
level of think tanks neither explicitly portrayed it as an ethnic liberation struggle nor 
demonstrated an apparently patriotic spirit.  
 
Ethnic Liberation Struggle- Self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh 
 
The war was portrayed as an ethnic struggle in which the Armenian nation could only be 
liberated when Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh were able to achieve complete 
independence from Azerbaijan through self-determination. The Armenian side 
emphasised that Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh had the rights of self-determination 
and their independence should be recognised by the international community. During the 
war in 2020, Armenians were fighting at the frontline because the international 
community has been failing to recognise the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 
Both the levels of officials and think tanks, to a varied extent respectively, portrayed the 
war as one between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. While at the level of social 
communities, such differentiation was ambiguous. Nonetheless, many of the Facebook 
posts still emphasised Armenians all over the world were trying to assist those living in 
Nagorno-Karabakh to gain their recognition of independence. 
 
At the level of officials, it was clearly stated by Pashinyan that the role of the entire 
Armenian nation is to assist and support the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh for their 
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rights to self-determination, according to his interview with France 24 (2020). He pointed 
out that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict nowadays is not an Armenian-Azerbaijan one but 
one between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan (France 24, 2020). In another interview 
with The Spectator (Komireddi, 2020), Pashinyan also suggested the essence of the 
conflict does not lie in the matters of territorial disputes. He stated that the main issue of 
this conflict is how Azerbaijan has failed to recognize the self-determination of people in 
Nagorno-Karabakh and how it has been violently oppressing the peaceful movements of 
self-determination (Komireddi, 2020). Pashinyan posted a number of photos on Twitter 
showing the Armenian diaspora asking for recognition of independence of Nagorno-
Karabakh with the national flags being waved all over the world (Pashinyan, 2020h). 
Thus, there was a clear message in Pashinyan’s discourse that Armenian unity in this war 
referred to the support to the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and their rights to self-
determination. Besides, to Pashinyan, when the Armenian nation was united, it would be 
victorious for the nation. As what he wrote on twitter, “For the fatherland, for victory” 
(Pashinyan, 2020b, para. 2). 
 
At the level of think tanks, there was no obvious or specific focus on the rights of self-
determination during the time frame observed. Nonetheless, similar to Pashinyan, they 
were also calling the war the “Artsakh-Azerbaijan dispute” (ACNIS, 2020f, para. 3). The 
name ‘Artsakh’ has the implication of self-determination of ethnic Armenians in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, we could observe that at the level of think tanks, this war was 
also considered as an ethnic struggle between Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Azerbaijan. 
 
While at the level of social communities, by using the hashtag #ArtskahStrong, the 
Armenian diaspora were writing posts to express their support of the rights to self-
determination of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. They believed self-
determination is the fundamental right of the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
“They are now on the forefront of civilization fighting an enemy that has no regard for 
international law and human rights. They are fighting for their fundamental rights to self 
determination” (Stambulyan, 2020, para. 2). It was also clearly illustrated that this 
liberation struggle was an ethnic struggle at the level of social communities. For example, 
by quoting an international lawyer Alfred de Zayas, Ghaplanyan (2020) suggested on 
Facebook that “It is time to reject the obsolete idea of one ethnic group ruling over another 
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ethnic group” (para. 1). It pointed out that people from Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh 
belong to different ethnic groups. Thus, Nagorno-Karabakh should no longer be ruled by 
Azerbaijan. Moreover, in a post written by Boycott Turkey (2020), It was pointed out that 
according to the UNSC resolutions, Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region have 
been considered as a party involved in the conflict. This post also emphasised that the 
Armenian people of the Nagorno-Karabakh region have never been recognised as a part 
of Azerbaijan.  
 
National Unity as the Strength at the War 
 
At both the level of officials and the level of social communities, Armenians emphasised 
national unity as a part of their ‘self’ against the others. To Armenians, the ‘self’ was 
strong in the war because the nation was united. The ultimate message presented by the 
social communities regarding national unity was how the war has brought the Armenian 
nation together. Furthermore, it was stressed that even though Armenia is a country with 
a small population, the nation is strong because Armenians all over the world were united 
and the Armenian soldiers were brave. In this narrative, it emphasised a nation should not 
be determined by borders. In other words, the defensive ‘self’ of Armenians in this war 
was borderless. 
 
For instance, Pashinyan emphasised that in order to win the war, Armenians had to be 
united. In one of his posts on Twitter (Pashinyan, 2020a), he said: 
All Armenians must unite to defend our history, our homeland, identity, our future 
and our present. And we will win and there is only one prerogative, that we promise 
ourselves that we won't retreat a single millimeter from defending our people and 
our Artsakh. (Para. 1) 
 
Unity was portrayed by Armenians as their approach to peace and their embracement of 
the value of human rights. The demonstration of unity of Armenians all over the world 
was the most observable at the level of social communities. The photos uploaded by social 
communities about the peaceful movements for independence of Nagorno-Karabakh and 
condemnation of terrorism demonstrated their desire to portray Armenian unity as 
borderless. At the same time, they told the world that Armenians and the Armenian Army 
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were fearless when it came to protecting their nation. For example, various posts were 
showing the Armenian Army dancing before going into the battlefield, such as the post 
uploaded by Armenians in Lebanon (2020). They illustrated the Armenian spirit by telling 
the world how the diaspora were coming back to their homeland for the patriotic fight. 
For example, a post was showing a group of diaspora cheering on the plane during their 
flight to Yerevan (Jacobs, 2020). They also suggested both Armenian men and women 
were embracing this national spirit. Seeds Of Armenia (2020) told the world with photos 
that Armenian women were strong and brave to join the frontline and protect their 
homeland. By showing the photos, this post indicated these Armenian women were role 
models for Armenian young girls. 
 
Moreover, it was especially the social communities who attempted to demonstrate they 
were striking for peace in a peaceful manner. They wished to portray that the peaceful 
‘self’ was distinctive from the brutal ‘other’. For instance, there were posts expressing 
their regards to Nagorno-Karabakh through art forms, such as music. “Sometimes music 
speaks more than words” (Garabedian, 2020, para. 1). “Not all weapons are deadly, music 
is one of the most important weapons that has for centuries inspired, motivated, united, 
and fueled hope in times of war” (Art Simon Production, 2020, para.1). Another example 
to illustrate how they emphasised they were demonstrating in a peaceful manner could be 
the video of Armenians in Czech Republic standing in silence with banners in their hands 
condemning Azerbaijani aggression (Ghazaryan, 2020).  
 
Conclusion of the Narrative 
 
In this narrative, the war in 2020 signified a patriotic mission of the entire Armenian 
nation. As mentioned, the ‘self’, i.e. the Armenian nation, regardless of where they were 
located, were unified in the war to stand against the ‘other’. The ‘self’ was borderless. 
While the ‘other’, i.e. Turkey and Azerbaijan were brutal. Because the Armenian nation 
was unified, they were the stronger party in the war.  
 
Besides, ‘unity of the Armenian nation’ here signified the peaceful movements of 
Armenians around the world and across borders. These peaceful movements had two 
objectives. They asked for international recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh independence 
and the condemnation of terrorist activities conducted by Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
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4.3 War on Western and Christian Values 
 
Similar to the narrative of Genocide 2.0, the narrative of war on Western and Christian 
values portrayed the brutality of Turkey and Azerbaijan. However, unlike Genocide 2.0, 
Armenians in this narrative were portrayed as ‘saving the world from the evils’. While 
Genocide 2.0 described how the brutality was threatening the ‘self’ of Armenians as a 
nation, this narrative took the ‘self’ to a global level. It portrayed how the world suffered 
from the brutality of Turkey and Azerbaijan. The ‘self’ in this narrative was democratic, 
humane and legitimate. According to them, the Western and Christian values were the 
universal values of human rights embraced by civilised societies. While the ‘other’ was 
authoritarian, terrorist and illegitimate, who undermined the Western and Christian values 
of human rights. It is a narrative in which Armenians were fighting for the world to protect 
human rights. In this narrative, countries which embrace the same values with Armenia 
should take up the responsibility and help Armenia fight against the evil ‘other’. The 
international community were condemned by Armenians because of how they failed to 
act upon such responsibility. 
 
Fighting against International Terrorism  
 
Labelling the war as a part of the international terrorism, Armenians emphasised it was a 
threat to the civilisation. Besides, international terrorism in this narrative was often 
associated with radical Islamic ideologies.  
 
On Twitter, Pashinyan mentioned that, “This terrorism equally threatens the United States, 
Iran, Russia, and France” (Pashinyan, 2020e, para. 1). When Pashinyan was explaining 
the reason Turkey was committing the second genocide of Armenians, he suggested it 
was the Turkish expansionist agenda at play (France 24, 2020). He also stated that, “Don’t 
be surprised if they attempt to incorporate into their empire not only the Greek islands but 
expand further into continental Europe. If Turkey succeeds in this, wait for them in 
Vienna” (France 24, 2020, para. 5). Pahsinyan’s statements clearly pointed out it was 
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Turkey committing international terrorism. If it was not stopped, not just Armenia but the 
global security would also be threatened.  
 
At the level of social communities, Armenian diaspora all over the world were urging the 
international community not to stay silent to the brutality of Azerbaijan and Turkey, by 
providing photos as evidence of them attacking the civilian homes. The social 
communities also photoshopped pictures to tell the world this war was driven by 
international terrorism. For instance, the post written by Beberian (2020) suggested this 
was “a war against civilization” (para. 1) with a picture featuring Turkey as a terrorist. 
There were also various posts calling this war a war crime. For example, the post of Deem 
Communications (2020) was calling it a war crime and attaching pictures that requested 
different countries to stop the war crime and protect the respective Western values of 
human rights these countries claim to uphold. 
 
In fact, Armenians illustrated what would happen to the world if the terrorism was not 
stopped. “Azerbaijani-Turkish union with the radical Islamic groups attacked Artsakh. 
They are targeting the peaceful population and the civil infrastructures, which can lead to 
an environmental disaster” (Vardanian, 2020, para. 2). Besides, Khzrtian (2020) 
suggested the attacks by the Azerbaijani side during the outbreak of Covid-19 created 
more political instability and turmoil on a global scale. It illustrated there was 
international terrorism involved in this war and global disasters could be waiting ahead. 
They asked for the international community to take actions and stop this terrorism before 
it is too late.  
 
Democratic ‘Self’ VS Authoritarian ‘Other’ 
 
In this narrative, another noticeable storyline was the otherness applied between 
democracy and dictatorship. It was about dictatorship as the evil ‘other’ challenging 
humanity by attacking the democratic ‘self’. The Armenian side was representing the 
democratic side in this war.  
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At the level of officials, Pashinyan clearly stated that the Armenian side was fighting for 
democracy. In the interview with The Spectator (Komireddi, 2020), he said, “It is a fight 
for democracy because it is the war of dictatorship against democracy” (para. 26).  
 
This was also echoed by the level of think tanks. Giragosian wrote in Institut Montaigne 
(2020) that the danger Azerbaijan posed to the world came from its lack of legitimacy as 
an undemocratic authoritarian regime. In that article, he also suggested such authoritarian 
nature being in contrast with Armenia’s democracy was a reason behind its attacks. To 
emphasise the contrast between Azerbaijan’s autocracy and Armenia’s democracy, 
Giragosian wrote that, “While Armenia has emerged as a fully respected and legitimate 
democracy since its 2018 revolution, the political power in Azerbaijan is derived from 
family, with power passing from father-to-son through the rule of the Aliyev dynasty” 
(Institut Montaigne, 2020, para. 6). By describing the authoritarian nature of Azerbaijan 
as dangerous, it was consistent with the arguments about this war being fought against 
threatening ideologies. 
 
Similarly, the social communities also spoke against the evil ‘other’ by labelling the 
difference between a regime of dictatorship and democracy. For example, when 
describing the brutal aggression of Turkey and Azerbaijan, Nazaretyan (2020) stated, 
“This is what happens when a democratic state deals with a dictatorship sultanate duo 
where the presidency is passed from father to son” (para. 7). Iskajyan (2020) also 
mentioned that, “Dictatorship of Aliyev family, where foreign journalists and all social 
media channels are banned, continues to attack together with Terrorist Erdogan” (para. 
2).  
 
Christian ‘Self’ VS Muslim ‘Other’ 
 
Under the narrative of fighting against international terrorism, Armenians’ claim of 
protecting Christian values from the radical Islamic terrorism was observable. This 
storyline was the most prevalent at the level of social communities. Armenians considered 
themselves as the Christian ‘self’. This Christian ‘self’, similar to the democratic ‘self’ 
and the ‘self’ that embraces the Western values of human rights, was rhetorically 
associated with the rest of the world who shared the same values, including most of the 
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Western countries. In this storyline, the Muslim ‘other’ was considered to be invasive 
because this ‘other’ was threatening to the Christian values that the ‘self’ upholds.  
 
The Christian ‘self’ was portrayed as defensive in the war. There was a post written by a 
page called This is Christian Mesopotamia. In the post, an old woman holding a gun was 
shown in the photos (This is Christian Mesopotamia, 2020). In the same post, it was stated 
that  “Elderly Armenian Christian grandmother protects her home against the army of 
Azerbaijan” (This is Christian Mesopotamia, 2020, para. 1). The Christian ‘self’ was 
defending themselves because they were threatened by radical Muslims. In fact, 
Armenians believed Turkey and Azerbaijan were being international terrorists not only 
because of the employment of the Syrian mercenaries. A post written by Boris Abadzhyan 
for Missouri (2020) condemned the use of the word “Ghazwa'' by Erdogan in his 
statement. Because this word, according to Boris Abadzhyan for Missouri (2020), has the 
implication of eliminating non-Muslim population. Another example could be Pusley 
(2020) quoting words from the Bible and applying it to the situation of this war, accusing 
Turkey and Azerbaijani of committing crimes that God hates and would not allow.  
 
Another reason behind their belief that when Armenia is attacked, the Christian ‘self’ is 
attacked stemmed from their pride of the Armenian nation being the first Christian nation 
in the world. For example, A post posted by Written By Lena (2020) suggested that 
“Armenia – the world’s first Christian nation – is under attack” (para. 1). It then continued 
by stating that, “An early cradle of Christianity - a proud sentinel on the frontiers of global 
faith and freedom - is, today, in existential danger” (para. 2). When the war was described 
as a war of global faith, the statement associated Christianity with humanity. It 
emphasised the importance of Armenia, not only to the Christian values, but also to 
humanity. 
 
At the level of think tanks, this religious othering was also briefly applied. According to 
the weekly update between the 10th-17th October by ACNIS (2020f), “It is mostly caused 
by obsessive Turkish-Azeri hatred against Armenians, and a delusional belief that 
historically Armenian lands are not Armenian, and that these lands should instead belong 
to Muslim Azeris or Turks” (para. 3). Nonetheless, such othering at the level of think 
tanks did not illustrate how the Armenians considered themselves to be protecting the 
Christian values from the Muslim ‘other’. 
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Armenians are the Protectors of the ‘Self’ 
 
While Armenians apparently differentiated the ‘self’ and ‘other’ according to the contrast 
of values upheld in this war, there was also an internal split of the ‘self’ observed in their 
storylines. The split was between Armenians themselves and the international community. 
Armenians were seeing themselves fighting at the frontline, as a protector of these values, 
unlike the international community who failed to act upon the values they uphold. They 
also called upon the international community to take the appropriate actions. 
 
At the level of officials, the internal split of ‘self’ was not an obvious storyline. Generally 
speaking, Pashinyan was telling the world that Armenians were fighting to protect the 
world at the frontline and the international community should show their support to the 
‘self’ by recognising the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, since the right to self-
determination is a value that the ‘self’ of this narrative was upholding. When Armenian 
forces were fighting at the frontline for the world at the battlefield, Pashinyan described 
the border of Nagorno-Karabakh as the “civilizational frontline” (Pashinyan, 2020e, para. 
1) against international terrorism and protecting the global security (Pashinyan, 2020e). 
In other words, by writing this post, Pashinyan pointed out that the frontline of this war 
was not only a frontline on the battlefield, but also the frontline of the entire civilisation, 
i.e. the world. Besides, according to him (Pashinyan, 2020d): 
It is no longer merely the Karabakh issue, nor a security issue of the Armenian 
people. It is now an issue of international security, and today, the Armenian people 
are defending also international security, assuming what may be a new historic 
mission. (para. 1) 
From that, Pashinyan’s rhetoric portrayed the role of the Armenian nation as the protector 
of the world, i.e. the ‘self’ of this narrative. Moreover, in a Twitter post of Pashinyan, he 
wrote “Artsakh- symbol of world justice” (Pahsinyan, 2020g, para. 2). In the same post, 
he called upon nations “who pursue justice, freedom and love & who are against violence, 
corruption, terrorism”  (para. 1) to support the Armenians who were fighting for these 
values. Firstly, this phrase expressed the values of ‘Artsakh’ upholding. In fact, the name 
‘Artsakh’ signified the rights to self-determination of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-
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Karabakh. The name has been used widely by Armenians when expressing their view 
upon the rights to self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh. By associating ‘Artsakh’ 
with world justice, it implied a message that self-determination is a universal human right 
which symbolises world justice. Secondly, the rhetorical effect here connected the 
Armenian side with the democratic countries and included them as a part of the “self”. 
Being this “self” together with Armenia, these countries shared the responsibility of 
protecting the values together with Armenia.  
 
At the level of think tanks, there was no content explicitly describing the internal split of 
the ‘self’. However, when describing how the international community acted on their own 
policies, ACNIS (2020e) suggested “when they came to power, they proclaimed about 
their commitment to those values as a state policy. But it is wrong to think that 
international relations are anchored on those value systems” (para. 5). This quote showed 
how ACNIS (2020e) believed that the international community failed to implement the 
policies in compliance with the values they were supposed to be committed with. Yet, 
there was no specific context mentioned in the article. 
 
Nonetheless, at the level of social communities, the implication of an internal split of the 
‘self’ was obvious. Firstly, Armenian forces were often described or illustrated as heroes 
who were fighting for the world. Here are a couple of quotes from the Facebook posts 
observed. “Heroes of Artsakh and Armenia are fighting for not only our lives, but also 
for the region to stop the international terrorism, to stop the aggression” (Vardanian, 2020, 
para. 2). “Armenia fights for everyone, Armenia fights for YOU” (Digital Factory, 2020, 
para. 2). Similarly, in another post (Lemur.ooo, 2020), Armenian soldiers at the frontline 
had their uniforms photoshopped. They were portrayed as the heroic figures from the 
Hollywood movies produced by Marvel. It is well known that Marvel heroes have always 
been associated with the image of saving the world. Such portrayal of images illustrated 
the point that Armenians considered their soldiers not only saving their own people and 
homeland, but also the world. By illustrating the Armenian forces as world heroes, it was 
consistent with the narrative that Armenia was fighting not only for themselves, but for 
the democratic values overall. Secondly, there were Facebook posts portraying the 
indifferent attitude of the international community towards this war. For example, 
Apozyan (2020) posted a picture on Facebook showing “how the World is going to stop 
terroristic [sic] attack on Armenia and Artsakh by Turkey and Azerbaijan” (Apozyan, 
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2020, para.1). Yet, the picture of this post illustrated the international community, 
including the UN, the OSCE Minsk Group and the anti-terrorist organizations remained 
silently watching when Armenia was the only one fighting against Pan-Turkism. In other 
words, Apozyan (2020) illustrated the contrast of how the world was supposed to act and 
the actions they actually took during this war. Besides, Another post was warning the 
world how Armenians were dying because of the ignorance of the international 
community. “And while the world continues just to condemn, my people are being killed” 
(Armenia, para. 1, 2020). 
 
The portrayal of an internal split of the ‘self’ was also noticeable among the Facebook 
posts describing the Armenian side as a protector of the Christian values. It was also 
illustrated that they were angry at the indifferent attitude of the world in protecting the 
Christian values from the hands of the Muslim ‘other’. According to them, this ‘self’ was 
defending for all the Christians in the world, yet the world remained silent to the threats 
against the entire Christianity. “While the Christians all over the World call on sides and 
express deep concern, this small Christian Nation is fighting to save the Christian World 
from Pan-Turkism” (Karapetyan, 2020, para. 1). “They know about the war against 
Christian Armenia by 100 million Muslim Turks, but they pretend to be deaf and blind. 
What a shame” (Hajian, 2020, para. 2). From this, a belief that the world should stand 
with the Christian Armenians against the Muslim Turks was observable. It again 
illustrated the Christian ‘self’ included the international community. When they failed to 
act according to the responsibility of this ‘self’, it was a shame.  
 
Conclusion of the Narrative 
 
In this narrative, this war signified a fight against international terrorism, which was a 
threat to the values the ‘self’ embraced. This ‘self’ included the international community 
who supported the same values with the Armenian ‘self’. International security was under 
threat when Western and Christian values were being attacked. To them, democracy and 
Christianity signified universal human rights and justice. While dictatorship and 
authoritarianism signified illegitimate and dangerous values that were threatening human 
rights. In this narrative, the brutal ‘other’ was also Turkey and Azerbaijan since they were 
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perceived by Armenians as authoritarian and radical, who were dangerous to the values 
Armenians embraced.  
 
There was also an internal split of the ‘self’ observed. The internal split was due to the 
indifference of the world when Armenians were the only one protecting the values. By 
including the international community as the ‘self’ yet indicating the problem of this 
internal split, Armenians presented to the world that they were on the side of justice in 
the war, who should be backed by the world.  
 
From this narrative, we could see how the signifiers such as ‘human rights’ were defined 
according to how ‘democracy’ and ‘Christianity’ signified in the war from the Armenian 
perspective. According to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theoretical framework, 
‘democracy’ and ‘Christianity’ would be the central signifiers in this narrative. These 
notions provided definitions to Armenians’ definition of ‘human rights’. As such, we 
observe that ‘human rights’ were an embracement of Western democratic values and what 





















5. Azerbaijani Narratives 
 
5.1 Armenian Terrorism  
 
The narrative of Armenian terrorism involves the storylines of Armenia launching 
strategic attacks, insulting the Azerbaijnai culture, murdering civilians, committing ethnic 
cleansing and conducting disinformation strategy against Azerbaijanis. In this narrative, 
Armenia violated the 1949 Geneva Convention and was portrayed as the brutal ‘other’. 
While the ‘self’ - Azerbaijanis were the victims suffering from the Armenian terrorism 
and the ignorance of the world, which was believed to be the result of Armenian 
disinformation strategy.  
 
This narrative will be explained by firstly addressing the storylines that support the claim 
of Armenia being the terrorist. Last but not least, this narrative will be concluded by 
illustrating Azerbaijanis’ belief on the rationale of Armenia conducting terrorist acts, i.e. 
their expansionist policy. 
 
Strategic offensive attacks  
 
According to AzerNews (2020i), the missile attacks in October were targeting the South 
Caucasus Pipeline and the Western Export Pipeline. The news article also suggested the 
bomb from the Armenia side on the 6th October landed 10 meters aways from the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. According to the same news article, these attacks “were 
underlined as terror attacks to the regional and international energy security, as well as 
the interest of the countries represented in such projects” (AzerNews, 2020i, para. 4). In 
other words, these strategic attacks illustrated the intention of Armenia to threaten 
regional security in general.  
 
At the level of think tanks, they also suggested that by launching attacks against 
Azerbaijan, Armenian had the intention to destroy the strategic projects of energy 
infrastructure such as the pipeline projects of Azerbaijan and its partners (AIR Center, 
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2020e). According to them, damages to these projects could cause economic frustrations 
in the short term and political impacts in the long term.  
 
Among the social communities, there were also a number of posts accusing Armenia of 
targeting the important energy infrastructures. For example, Yusif (2020) also suggested 
Armenians attacked the city of Mingachevir because of the energy resources from the 
reservoir and the power plants in the Khitai and Absheron region of the city. Hasanov 
(2020) suggested Armenia launched strategic attacks with the attempt to destroy the oil 
pipeline connecting Baku, Tbilisi and Ceyhan. Hasanov (2020) illustrated the attacks with 
an infographic. Many of the Facebook posts suggested such action did not only threaten 
Azerbaijan but also Europe. For instance, Sabir (2020) stated that this pipeline is currently 
an important energy provider to Europe that was heavily invested by the Western 
countries.  
 
In fact, all levels of participants were consistent in illustrating the storyline about Armenia 
launching these strategic attacks. 
 
Cultural and Religious Insults 
 
At the level of think tanks, it was believed that the escalation of Armenian aggression in 
2020 was not solely expressed through military means, but it was also a political and 
cultural aggression. It was suggested that the war in 2020 did not start in September but 
in the middle of July that year when Armenia targeted the Tovuz district, with a 76-year-
old civilian killed (AIR Center, 2020a). According to Aliyev and echoed by AIR Center 
(2020a), the actions taken by Pashinyan in Nagorno-Karabakh were insulting the 
Azerbaijani culture. This included the establishment of the presidential and parliamentary 
system and the attempt to move the parliament to the city of Shusha (AIR Center, 2020a). 
Besides, according to the AIR Center (2020f), Shusha is a historical and sacred city of 
Azerbaijan. Yet, Pashinyan illegally settled Armenian families, who came from Lebanon, 
in the occupied territories including the city of Shusha (AIR Center, 2020f).  
 
Civilians being killed, ethnic cleansing  
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This part of the narrative told the world how brutal Armenia was when it came to civilians. 
The evidence provided included the attacks launched against the city of Ganja and 
Mingachevir during the war in 2020 and the ethnic cleansing committed against 
Azerbaijani people in the territory illegally occupied by Armenia. The narrative also 
portrayed how Azerbaijani refugees and the displaced failed to return to their homeland 
because of Armenia. 
 
At the level of officials, on multiple occasions, Aliyev called Armenia a fascist, 
considering Armenia ethnically cleansed the Azerbaijanis from the occupied region. 
Besides, it was suggested by Aliyev that “Armenia's fascist leadership has perpetrated 
next war crime, fired on the cities of Gandja and Mingechevir using tactical operational 
missile system. They will be held accountable for this crime. Our revenge happens on the 
battlefield” (Aliyev, 2020k, para. 1). By calling it war crime, Aliyev clearly affirmed the 
brutality of Armenia in this war. 
 
AzerNews (2020h) published a piece of article written by Andrew Korybko, an American 
analyst based in Moscow. “It's Armenia, not Azerbaijan, that's waging a genocidal war, 
and it must be stopped before it can cause any more suffering” (para 7). Here, it illustrated 
a clear indication of Armenia being the brutal ‘other’ but not Azerbaijan. Instead of 
directly saying the Azerbaijanis were ethnically cleansed by Armenia from Azerbaijan, 
he continued by saying, “This rogue state has already ruined over one million lives by 
ethnically cleansing its victims from their native lands, most infamously during the 
Khojaly massacre, and now it's threatening to expand the war even further” (para. 7). 
Without emphasising specifically that Azerbaijnais were the target of being ethnically 
cleansed, it illustrated an image of Armenians being brutal to humanity in general as they 
expel natives from their homeland.  
 
At the level of think tanks, AIR Center (2020f) suggested that the order of bombarding 
Ganja was issued by Harutyunyan, whom they called “the head of the occupational 
regime” (para. 6). According to them, the attack was launched after the ceasefire 
agreement reached in Moscow earlier. Moreover, the board member of the AIR Center 
Pashayeva also said that the Armenian side used Tochka-U to conduct their first attack 
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against the city of Ganja (Pashayeva, 2020f). According to her post, it caused numerous 
deaths and injuries, including children.  
 
At the level of social communities, There were two main phenomena among the Facebook 
posts regarding Armenian brutality against civilians. For the first one, many posts among 
the social communities emphasised that the illegal occupation had been 30 years long, 
covering about 20% of the Azerbaijnai territories. A post (Endorphin, 2020) was trying 
to show the international community what it was like to have 20% of land being occupied 
by a foreign country. Azerbaijanis pointed out that civilians being killed by the Armenian 
attacks in this war was the result of indifference among the international community. For 
instance, “this is what happens when occupation of 20% of sovereign state’s territory 
remains unpunished by the world for 30 years” (XƏBƏR ALƏMİ, 2020, para. 2). These 
posts were posted with the purpose of telling the international community the pain of 
Azerbaijani people under Armenian brutality. 
 
Another common phenomenon was describing the attacks Armenia launched against the 
cities in Azerbaijan in 2020. This included the attacks launched against the city of Ganja, 
the second largest city of Azerbaijan which is located far away from the conflict zone. 
There were also posts describing how the city of Mingachevir was attacked. All these 
Facebook posts were suggesting that Armenia was committing a war crime as they were 
attacking civilians. Vidoes, photos were illustrating how innocent homes were destroyed. 
They compared the number of injuries and casualties of civilians outside the conflict zone 
with that of Armenia (İctimai TV, 2020). Through such comparison, they illustrated that 
Azerbaijanis suffered more from the war and the Armenian side was the brutal “other”. 
 
Besides the two main phenomena observed, there were Facebook posts criticising the 
Armenian Army and suggesting they were using forbidden ballistic missiles to conduct 
their attacks. “Have you ever wondered what is SCUD? SCUD is a tactical ballistic 
missile that was used by Saddam Hussein. Today, Armenians have used it against 
innocent civilians in Ganja” (Aghayev, 2020, para. 1) (Turcomaniaball, 2020, para. 1). 
While the original source of this quote is unknown, it has been reposted by many 
Facebook users. Besides, it is also worth noting that the massacre of Khojaly was a 
focused topic mainly among the social communities. When Azerbaijanis were talking 
about the massacre, they aimed at reminding the world of what happened in the past with 
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Armenian aggression. For instance, AzerGold QSC (2020) posted a video telling the 
audience it was Armenia who always broke the ceasefire agreements. The video 
suggested Armenia occupied the city of Shusha one day after the ceasefire agreed in 
Tehran in 1992. Similarly, it was suggested by the video that the massacre of Khojaly 
was committed by Armenia five days after a ceasefire agreement signed by Azerbaijan, 
Armenia and Russia in Moscow in 1992. Then the video talked about how it was the same 
in 2020 with the attacks Armenians launched against the city of Ganja after the ceasefire 
negotiation.  
 
Disinformation Strategy  
 
The Armenian disinformation strategy is considered as a part of the narrative of Armenian 
terrorism. According to them, Armenians were spreading wrong information to the public. 
Azerbaijanis portrayed the ‘self’ as the victim of the mistrust from the world. They believe 
it was the disinformation strategy conducted by the Armenian side that promoted mistrust 
in the Western society against Azerbaijan. They suggested it was the Armenian 
propaganda undermining the public awareness of historical accuracy of the conflict. Thus, 
disinformation strategy was considered to be the means for the Armenian terror to be 
manifested.  
 
At the level of officials, Aliyev clearly stated that the information from the Armenian 
government was wrong during several interviews with the media channels from the West, 
such as Sky News (Aliyev, 2020f). In contrast, Armenia was suspected to be spreading 
old videos and claiming them to be reflecting the current situation (AzerNews, 2020b). 
 
At the level of think tanks, AIR Center (2020c) mentioned that the pro-Armenian trend 
has had a long history in the West, even in the early 20th century. According to them, the 
trend has been continued by the propaganda and lobby committed by the Armenian 
diaspora in the West, which include a network of professionals, scholars and politicians. 
AIR Center (2020c) stated that the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been 
framed by Armenia as a struggle of liberation and this idea has been adopted by the 
Western media. According to the same article, the problem of Western media was the 
lack of academic freedom that could fight against the xenophobic rhetorics.  
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At the level of social communities, people were asking for the international community 
to do their research and learn about the accurate history before deciding which side to 
support. Some of the frequently shared posts, such as those written by Hasanova (2020) 
and RazzaOfficial (2020), suggested there were many people, including celebrities, 
supporting Armenia because they failed to recognize the truth and the accurate history of 
the conflict.  
 
The Rationale behind Armenian Terrorism  
 
This part addresses the question of ‘why’ of this narrative. The terrorist acts conducted 
by Armenia were believed to be a part of their expansionist policy, according to 
Azerbaijanis. 
 
In fact, it was the level of think tanks the most active in directly pointing out Armenia 
being an expansionist. It was suggested that Armenian expansionism has been disguised 
as a struggle of liberation. “For liberals, it was presented as a self-determination struggle, 
while the end goal of the ultranationalist campaign was Armenia’s territorial expansion 
and the establishment of ‘Great Armenia’” (AIR Center, 2020e, para. 3). AIR Center 
(2020c) also mentioned that Pashinyan made claims targeting not only the territory of 
Azerbaijan, but also that of Turkey. Another example to illustrate the Armenian 
expansionist agenda was the recent celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the non-
implemented Treaty of Sevres, according to which Armenia would have gained the 
Eastern part of Turkey’s territory if implemented (AIR Center, 2020d). Moreover, AIR 
Center (2020a) stated that when Armenians were attacking the city of Ganja and the 
Tovuz district of Azerbaijan where projects of energy and infrastructure are hosted, 
Armenians’ ambition to conquer more territory became more evident. In other words, 
AIR Center (2020a) explained the strategic attacks from the Armenian side came from 
their intention of expanding their territory.  
 
There was a rumour that in order to conduct terrorism, Armenia allied with Russia. This 
storyline was also mainly produced by the level of think tanks. It was not an apparent 
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storyline on other levels. Armenia, although might have been dissatisfied with Russia’s 
influence in the region, it has been economically dependent on Russia’s support due to its 
small-sized population (AIR Center, 2020c). On the other hand, AIR Center (2020d) told 
the world it has long been reported that Russia was shipping a large number of arm 
supplies to Armenia through the more difficult routes instead of the shortest one that 
bypasses Georgia. Hence, it was suggested that Armenia and Russia could be forming an 
alliance. Although it was a storyline mainly produced at the level of think tanks, there 
were also voices regarding this among the social communities. For example, Babayev 
(2020) mentioned: 
The Russian Federation stands behind of terror executed against Azerbaijan and its 
people by Armenia, which is much smaller territory and population wise in 
comparison with Azerbaijan, Russia does not want to give up the region and 
oppresses Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis by supporting Armenian terrorist. (Para. 5) 
 
Conclusion of the Narrative 
 
In this narrative, the war signified Armenian terrorism. Armenia was the brutal ‘other’ 
while the Azerbaijani ‘self’ was the victim. This ‘self’ also suffered from the ignorance 
of the world. To Azerbaijanis, they believed this ignorance was a result of Armenian 
propaganda. It was also noticeable that among social communities, Azerbaijanis 
emphasised how their side suffered from such ignorance and how they wished the world 
to learn the accurate facts about this conflict.  
 
In fact, the storylines provided by Azerbaijanis on Armenian terrorism has reflected what 
‘terrorism’ signified from their perspective. In general, ‘terrorism’ here was referred to 
brutality against humanity. Such brutality was defined by committing harmful policies 
against innocent civilians and cultural and religious insults. Since Armenians were 
conducting these brutal activities, Armenians were considered to be terrorists. In this 
narrative, Azerbaijanis also explained the means through which Armenia achieved its 
brutality, i.e. launching offensive attacks, committing ethnic cleansing and disinformation 
strategy. While for the rationale behind such brutality, Azerbaijanis told the world about 





5.2 The Liberation of ‘Self’  
 
It is a narrative in which Azerbaijanis called this war a war of liberation. According to 
Azerbaijanis, they were suffering from a liberation struggle. It was about liberating the 
‘self’ from oppression. In order to achieve the liberation of ‘self’, it required the liberation 
of the occupied lands from the control of Armenia. To Azerbaijanis, the ‘self’ was 
patriotic. Thus, the ‘self’ could only be liberated when the territorial integrity of 
Azerbaijan was protected. 
 
Since Azerbaijanis considered the Nagano-Karabakh region and the other surrounding 
districts as a part of their territory with international recognition, they suggested their 
liberation operations were reasonable and legal under the international law. It is also a 
narrative portraying how the international community has failed to assist Azerbaijan on 
the issue of illegal occupation throughout the years. Thus, in order to regain the lost 
territory in this war, Azerbaijanis had no other alternatives but to fight against Armenia 
on the battlefield.  
 
The Liberation of ‘Self’ was Patriotic  
 
In this narrative, the ‘self’ was patriotic and the liberation operations demonstrated the 
patriotic spirit. In fact, the war in 2020 has been called a ‘Patriotic War’ by the Azerbaijani 
side. It was mainly driven by the statement of Aliyev. In the interview with Sky News 
(Aliyev, 2020f), for example, Aliyev stated that this war was a ‘Patriotic War’ to 
Azerbaijanis. At the level of think tanks, the liberation of lands being a part of the 
Azerbaijani patriotic spirit was also noticeable. When talking about the Azerbaijani 
soldiers, Pashayeva (2020b) mentioned that, “There's no longer any doubt that they will 
gain the victory in a spirit of sincere patriotism” (para. 1). This war being a patriotic war 
was often echoed by the social communities. Here are some examples from Facebook 
regarding liberation and patriotism. “Armed forces of Azerbaijan are waging military 
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activities on 7 occupied territories of Azerbaijan which have been recognized as such by 
UN’s resolutions. It’s a patriotic and liberation war” (Mardanova, 2020, para. 1). 
“Azerbaijan is waging a patriotic war of liberation for the return of its territories. The 
Azerbaijani army does not attack Armenia, it returns the territories illegally occupied and 
held by the Armenian army for 30 years” (Asgarova, 2020, para. 1). These statements 
connected the Azerbaijani military operations to both the idea of liberation and patriotism. 
It illustrated how they believed the war of liberation was patriotic. 
 
In fact, descriptions of what happened on the battlefield also showed their patriotic spirit. 
Besides, the patriotic implication was apparent when Aliyev emphasised how strong the 
Azerbaijnai forces were on the battlefield. Examples are, such as “Azerbaijan repelled the 
enemy befittingly and they failed to move an inch forward” (Aliyev, 2020a, para.1). “Our 
State has a strong will and a powerful army” (Aliyev, 2020i, para.1). Moreover, the 
language of Aliyev’s statements is worth noting. Besides how he termed the war as the 
liberation of Azerbaijani people, words such as “glorious”  and “victory” appeared 
multiple times in his posts on Twitter during the period observed. This was the same with 
how he repeatedly emphasised that Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Azerbaijan during the 
period. Such language is often considered to be emotionally triggering. By applying 
emotionally triggering language in his speeches and statements about a national matter, a 
patriotic message and spirit was expressed. 
 
On the other hand, there were multiple occasions where Aliyev and the Azerbaijani news 
agencies were stressing the strength of the Azerbaijani forces. It was illustrated by news 
agencies that the Azerbaijani diaspora were one with the country. For example, according 
to AzerNews (2020d), the embassy of Azerbaijan in Russia received many requests from 
Azerbaijanis living in Russia, nominating themselves to be sent to the frontline of the 
battlefield. It was also stated in this news article that Azerbaijan was not in need of more 
soldiers as the Azerbaijani Army was well-equipped with advanced weapons. In 
comparison, they often reported how the Armenian forces were losing in the battlefield. 
It was often illustrated by Aliyev and the news agencies. At the same time, AIR Center 
(2020f) interpreted the Armenian forces as acting out of their weakness and their fear. It 
was stated by AIR Center (2020f) that: 
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The tactics of the Azerbaijani army were so effective on the battlefield that 
Armenian army suffered heavy losses in personnel and military equipment. After 
defeat and the loss of positions, Armenian forces started to bomb the Azerbaijani 
cities far from the frontlines. (para. 4) 
 
Religious Liberation  
 
Another worth noting phenomenon in this narrative was the application of religious 
otherness. The liberation of ‘self’ also involved the liberation of the Muslim ‘self’. This 
phenomenon was especially apparent among the social communities. “No one remembers 
the mosques that were insulted and destroyed by Armenian separatists. Muslim dignity 
matters” (Əmiraslanova, 2020, para. 1). As such, we could observe that preserving 
religious dignity was a part of the liberation of the ‘self’. 
 
In fact, this Muslim ‘self’ did not only include Azerbaijanis or Turks. It included the entire 
Muslim world. There was a video uploaded by Alizade (2020) showing people hanging 
up the national flag of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Pakistan. While the location of the video 
being filmed is unknown, it illustrated the liberation of the Muslim ‘self’ by 
demonstrating the flags of Muslim countries being hung up. Voices about Muslim 
countries not being fairly treated were also apparent on Facebook. For instance, the post 
of Mirzəzadə (2020) stated, “This is what happens if you're a Muslim country the [sic] 
whole world goes silent” (para. 1). These statements were telling the world that Muslims 
were always oppressed, not just by Armenia, but also by the world in general. 
 
Nonetheless, the storyline of religious liberation was not consistent. It is still a 
controversial matter to discuss to what extent Azerbaijani people applied religious 
otherness in their storylines. It is noticeable that framing of this war being a religious one 
was explicitly condemned by some Azerbaijnai people. For instance, there was a post, 
written by Ismayilov (2020), emphasising this war was not a religious one, or else 
countries such as Ukraine, Israel and Georgia would not have been demonstrating support 
to Azerbaijnai people. During the same post, Ismayilov (2020) stated, “Armenia is 
weaponizing religion, radicalizing their youth with racism and ethnic hatred sentiment” 
(para. 1). In fact, this post indicated it was Armenians who were putting religious matters 
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into this war but not Azerbaijanis. Rebuttal against Armenians’ arguments regarding 
religious matters was not uncommon among the social communities. For instance, 
Məmmədova (2020) was trying to emphasise this was a war against occupation instead 
of religious matters, unlike what Armenians and the Western media suggested. 
Məmmədova (2020) stated, “Muslim Azerbaijan is attacking Christian Armenia. 
Complete lie. Azerbaijan has excellent relations with all Christian nations, from [the] 
Vatican to our neighbor Georgia. It is not a religious war. It is a war against occupation!” 
(para. 1). Here is another example (Zahidoglu, 2020): 
This is why it is inadmissible to portray the conflict between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia as an interfaith war. This war is about liberating Armenian-occupied 
territories, restoring justice and the return of approximately 800.000 internally 
displaced people to their home. (para. 5) 
Such discourse also illustrated the self-identification of Azerbaijani Muslims as friendly 
to other religions, unlike what Armenia described. These statements featured the 
contradicting opinion among Azerbaijanis on what liberation of the ‘self’ signified within 
their society. Yet, the ‘self’ suffering from long-term occupation was an indisputable 
reason behind their attempt of liberation. This internal split of opinion did not undermine 
their belief that Azerbaijanis must be liberated and such liberation could only be achieved 
through regaining the lost territory.  
 
Interestingly, the statements regarding how the Muslim ‘self’ have been oppressed by the 
world resonated with a more general storyline of the Azerbaijani ‘self’ being oppressed 
by other forces. For instance, Babayev (2020) talked about how Azerbaijan has suffered 
from oppression not only under the Armenian influence, but also under imperialism for 
more than 300 years. This is an example illustrating that on top of the long history of 
being oppressed, Armenian oppression against the Azerbaijanis have become more 
unbearable for the Azerbaijani people. In other words, Azerbaijanis believed it was not 
only the Muslim ‘self’ being oppressed by the world, but the entire ‘self’ of Azerbaijanis 
in general.  
 
 
Regaining Territorial Integrity to Liberate the ‘Self’  
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In this part, we explain how Azerbaijani people considered regaining the territory as the 
means to achieve their liberation of ‘self’. As mentioned in previous parts, the main 
emphasis of this storyline suggested the occupation of lands by Armenia was a political 
oppression the ‘self’ suffered from. It was because the territorial integrity of ‘self’ was 
undermined and many displaced Azerbaijanis and refugees failed to return to their 
homeland because of the Armenian illegal occupation.  
 
It was expressed that allowing the displaced Azerbaijanis to return to their home would 
be a liberation of the ‘self’. On the Twitter account of Aliyev, he regularly listed the 
names of villages that were liberated by the Azerbaijani Army. According to him, the 
expelled Azerbaijani population from the occupied lands would be returned to their 
homeland. “We will build cities across the liberated lands and turn those areas into 
paradise. Those lands will reinvigorate, life and children’s laughter will return there. 
Citizens of Azerbaijan will live on those lands in dignity” (Aliyev, 2020h, para. 1). Again, 
this Twitter post illustrated it was a matter of dignity for the Azerbaijani people to return 
to their homeland after liberation. 
 
At the same time, the social communities also demonstrated how the successful return of 
lands and villages achieved the spirit of liberating the ‘self’. There were posts spreading 
the glory of liberation with photos showing the Azerbaijani national flags on the lands. 
Many of the posts also echoed the official announcement regarding the success of 
liberation. They were welcoming such returns. All the posts were written with an uplifted 
and positive tone describing how they were proud of the liberation and the success of 
protecting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. For instance, “Brave army of Azerbaijan 
liberated Fuzuli from 27 year-long occupation. Almost 130000 people have a home now 
to return to” (Azərbaycan Avtomobil Yolları Dövlət Agentliyi, 2020, para. 1). Another 
example could be Bee Travel Azerbaijan (2020) stating that, “New tourism destination of 
Azerbaijan - Suqovushan” (para. 1). The post was then continued, “Suqovushan was 
occupied by the Republic of Armenia in 1994. On October 3, 2020, it was liberated by 
the Azerbaijani Armed Forces'' (para. 2).  
 
Liberation through Military Means 
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A part of this narrative suggested such liberation of ‘self’ could only be achieved through 
military means. According to them, the international community has not been actively 
providing support to Azerbaijan regarding the issues of illegal occupation. Thus, 
regaining the control of lands by fighting on the battlefield became the only key to relieve 
the ‘self’ from oppression. Pashayeva (2020e) suggested that Azerbaijan was acting as a 
“catalytic role” (para. 1) when it came to the issue of occupied territory, as Armenians 
refused to return the lands without strong external pressure, nor has the international 
community given efficient pressure in these 3 decades (Pashayeva, 2020c). In other words, 
She pointed out that in order to liberate the ‘self’, Azerbaijan must take its actions as it 
did on the battlefield during this war.  
 
Furthermore, the liberation of lands was called a “peace enforcement operation” (para. 2) 
in a Facebook post written by The Wire.Pk (2020). Under a formal definition, peace 
enforcement is usually operated when military means to the conflict is the only solution 
to achieve peace. Thus, peace enforcement operations are often conducted by third parties 
such as the UN. When Azerbaijanis did not only call the war a liberation war but also a 
‘peace enforcement operation’, it illustrated a storyline that the Azerbaijani forces came 
for peace as its ultimate goal and this goal could only be achieved through the necessary 
military means.  
 
Conclusion of the Narrative 
 
In other words, the war in this narrative signified the liberation of ‘self’ from the 
oppression of ‘other’. Armenians were the mainly emphasised ‘other’ who oppressed the 
‘self’ by illegally occupying the territory of Azerbaijan. While the ‘self’ here signified 
the Azerbaijani people and the Muslim world, there was an ambuity on the extent of 
religious otherness applied in their discourses. As mentioned, the discourses were 
contradicting to each other when it came to religious otherness. As such, we could also 
hardly draw conclusion on the extent the non-Muslim world was considered as an ‘other’ 
in this narrative. Nonetheless, the storyline about the oppressed Muslim ‘self’ emphasised 
the oppression Azerbaijanis have suffered throughout the years in general. In other words, 
the main feature of the ‘self’ in this narrative was being oppressed.  
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To them, ‘liberation’ signified the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan being achieved and 
that Azerbaijanis could live in their homeland. The liberation of ‘self’ could only be 
































5.3 International Justice 
 
This is a narrative in which Azerbaijanis emphasised they were fighting on the bases of 
international justice. International justice here was defined as abiding by international law 
and the legally binding UNSC resolutions. It was suggested by Azerbaijnais that 
Nagorno-Karabakh has been a part of the Azerbaijnai territory with international 
recognition. Besides, the UNSC resolutions demanded Armenia to withdraw its forces 
from the occupied territories.  
 
In this narrative, Azerbaijanis were portrayed as the cooperative ‘self’ in this narrative 
who conducted all the actions in compliance with international law and aimed for peaceful 
ceasefire resolutions. Armenians were portrayed as the main party of the uncooperative 
‘other’ who constantly broke the ceasefire agreements by their offensive attacks. At the 
same time, the biased third parties were also considered to be a part of the uncooperative 
‘other’ since they hindered the negotiation process. Moreover, separatism was considered 
to be a threat to global security in this narrative. Thus, Nagorno-Karabakh could not 
possibly be independent from Azerbaijan.  
 
Cooperative ‘Self’ and  Lawful Actions during the War 
 
This storyline emphasised Azerbaijan as the cooperative ‘self’, compared with the 
uncooperative ‘other’, which will be explained in detail later. Azerbaijanis illustrated the 
“self” as cooperative by providing evidence that all the actions taken by them in the war 
were in compliance with international law. This included, firstly, the liberation they 
fought for. The operation was believed to be reasonable and lawful since Nagorno-
Karabakh and other occupied districts were considered to be a part of Azerbaijan with 
international recognition. Secondly, this storyline included the argument that attacks 
launched by Azerbaijani forces during the period were justifiable as they were 
counteroffensive. This argument was mainly expressed at the level of officials.  
 
At the level of officials, during the interview with Sky News (Aliyev, 2020f), President 
Aliyev stated that Armenia must return the illegally occupied territory to Azerbaijan, as 
demanded by the UNSC resolutions. These resolutions are UNSC resolutions 822, 853, 
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874 and 884, according to multiple sources such as AzerNews (2020i). Moreover, Aliyev 
stated in the interview with Sky News (Aliyev, 2020f) that Armenians have only settled 
in Nagorno-Karabakh since the early 19th century. Thus, the claim of Nagorno-Karabakh 
belonging to Azerbaijan was a justified claim. He believed the victory of the war should 
belong to the lawful side. Therefore, the Azerbaijani ‘self’ should be the victorious side. 
For example, he stated that  “we are on the righteous path! Ours is the just cause! We will 
be victorious! Karabakh is ours! Karabakh is Azerbaijan!” (Aliyev, 2020b, para.1). 
Besides, Aliyev stated clearly about the different meanings this war implied to the 
Azerbaijanis and Armenians respectively. “For the Azerbaijani people, it is a liberation 
war. For Armenia, it is a war of occupation. Armenia’s occupation forces are on 
Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory. There is no way to justify it” (Aliyev, 
2020j, para. 1). This statement portrayed the two parties of this war fighting for 
completely different goals. Another Twitter post he wrote stating that, “Armenians’ 
position is rooted in historical lies and based on violation of norms and principles of 
international law, whereas our position is backed by historical justice and the norms and 
principles of the international law” (Aliyev, 2020e, para.1). Undoubtedly, there was an 
implication in these statements that while Azerbaijan’s goal was justifiable as they were 
fighting for international justice, Armenians were fighting for illegal objectives.  
 
At the level of think tanks, the narrative illustrated was aligned with the official level by 
emphasising the significance of international law in this conflict. In fact, there was an 
article of AIR Center (2020d) released with the title suggesting Azerbaijan had 
international law at its back when fighting on the battlefield. At the same time, AIR Center 
(2020d) echoed Aliyev on Azerbaijanis’ right on fighting on its territory and the promise 
that Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh were invited to live in the Azerbaijnai territory as 
a part of the ethnic diversity of the country. 
 
It was the same with social communities. In fact, most of the Facebook posts were talking 
about how Nagorno-Karabakh has always belonged to Azerbaijan based on international 
law. In order to strengthen their argument, some of them also focused on the history of 
the region. An example illustrating Nagorno-Karabakh as an internationally recognised 
territory of Azerbaijan based on history would be the post of Karayeva (2020). The post 
suggested Armenia did not follow the UNSC resolutions and the region was not ethnically 
Armenian at the beginning. Instead, she suggested the ethnic Armenian demography 
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nowadays was a result of Armenian terrorism, which could be dated back to 1992 when 
Armenia committed genocaide against Azerbaijani people in Khojaly (Karayeva, 2020). 
 
On the other hand, the cooperative ‘self’ was also portrayed as one aiming for peace by 
news agencies. For instance, Andrew Korybko, an American analyst based in Moscow 
stated that “Azerbaijan has the right to defend itself per Article 51 of the UN Charter, but 
its leadership still prefers to resolve the conflict peacefully” (AzerNews, 2020h, para. 7). 
He also suggested that Aliyev was hoping for the four UNSC resolutions being realised 
with the ceasefire brokered by Russia (AzerNews, 2020h).  
 
Moreover, Aliyev mentioned the civilian casualties caused by the Azerbaijani forces were 
never intentional. He told the media that during the war in 2020, all the attacks launched 
by the Azerbaijani forces against Armenia were in compliance with the international 
humanitarian law, unlike Armenia. For example, when being questioned about Armenian 
civilian structures being hit during the interview by Sky News (Aliyev, 2020f), Aliyev 
stated, “But we never on purpose, we never attack civilians. Yes, we have sophisticated 
weapons but not all of them are sophisticated. There could be some mistakes” (Azertag, 






In this storyline, otherness was applied to illustrate it was the “other” who had been 
hindering the ceasefire negotiation process of the war, which had to be ended mutually 
on a bilateral ground. The ceasefire negotiation process was stagnated because the 
uncooperative ‘other’ failed to serve justice on the issue. Armenians were labelled as the 
main uncooperative ‘other’ in their storyline. 
 
At the level of officials, Aliyev stated that “a ceasefire cannot be announced unilaterally. 
The decision has to be bilateral and implemented on the ground” (Aliyev, 2020d, para. 
1). However, the actions taken by the Armenian side were considered to be not 
cooperative. As they violated the ceasefire compromises by launching attacks against the 
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city of Ganja that killed innocent civilians. “It is a disrespect to the negotiations under 
Russia’s mediation and another embodiment of Armenian fascism. These heinous actions 
can never break the will of the Azerbaijani people!” (Aliyev, 2020g, para. 1) During the 
interviews with Sky News (Aliyev, 2020f), Aliyev also stated that it was Armenia who 
chose to continue the status quo. In the same interview, he suggested Armenia was 
occupying the seven districts surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh region with the claim 
of these districts being the security zones. Nonetheless, Aliyev also emphasised security 
could only be achieved through political and diplomatic means in the interview. Since 
Armenia failed to settle the security matter through these means, the war was kept in the 
status quo.  
 
The materials released by the Azerbaijani news agencies were portraying the same 
storylines as the level of officials. For instance, a piece of article written by another 
Azerbaijani-based media outlet Trend (2020) which was featured by AzerNews (2020c) 
stated the view of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Russia: 
Unfortunately, many years of negotiations on the return of territories by peaceful 
means didn’t lead to success and, accordingly, Azerbaijan is forced to use its legal 
right for self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter and make the aggressor 
liberate the Azerbaijani lands. (para. 7)  
It was also stated at the end of the same article that “the 1994 ceasefire agreement was 
followed by peace negotiations. Armenia has not yet implemented four UN Security 
Council resolutions on the withdrawal of its armed forces from Nagorno Karabakh and 
the surrounding districts” (para. 17). From this, the news article clearly pointed out it was 
Armenia being an uncooperative ‘other’. 
 
At the level of think tanks, AIR Center (2020d) suggested while Western scholars have 
been analysing the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh on geopolitics, they failed to recognise 
how significant international law was playing in the conflict. According to the AIR Center 
(2020d), the only solution to the conflict would be Armenia’s willingness to abide by the 
UNSC resolutions and withdraw its forces from the occupied lands. In fact, Armenia was 
portrayed as an uncooperative ‘other’ also with the following evidence mentioned. Firstly, 
Armenia illegally settled Lebanaese-Armenians in the occupied territories (AIR Center, 
2020f). On the other hand, according to AIR Center (2020d), the rhetoric of Armenia has 
also undermined the process of the ceasefire negotiation. It suggested Armenia was 
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demonstrating a non-cooperative attitude by rejecting documents on the table of 
negotiation moderated by the OSCE Minsk Group. Besides, according to their another 
article (AIR Center, 2020f), it has been detrimental to the negotiation process when 
Pashinyan kept questioning the “Madrid Principles” and the frameworks of the on-going 
negotiations. According to that article, it revealed the unwillingness of Armenia in ending 
the war.  
 
At the level of social communities, it was all consistent that Armenia was illustrated as 
an ‘other’ who undermined the ceasefire process. Echoing the level of officials and think 
tanks, the social communities also claimed the UNSC resolutions as the only guide to 
resolve the war and the conflict in general. 
 
It is noticeable that the attacks against the city of Ganja was an important focus on 
Facebook within the time frame observed. They accused Armenia as the one who 
undermined the ceasefire process and wasted the effort of mediation conducted by 
Moscow. For instance, it was stated in a post written by Network of Azerbaijani 
Canadians (2020): 
Armenian armed forces violated the truce, reached between the parties. The cease-
fire announcement came overnight after the Russian sponsored 10 hours of talks in 
Moscow. The deal stipulated that the cease-fire should pave the way for talks on 
settling the conflict. However, Armenia broke the truce with new missile attacks 
on Azerbaijan’s civil settlements. (para. 3) 
 
Another post written on Facebook illustrated the contrast between the cooperative ‘self’ 
and the uncooperative ‘other’. The original source of the post, however, is unknown. The 
same post was posted repeatedly by authors such as KoreaAz (2020), Bashirov (2020) 
and Aslan (2020): 
Azerbaijan could liberate its territories 30 years ago. Could also do that during 30 
recent years. Our country has a numerical superiority of the army, a numerical and 
qualitative superiority of equipment and military weapons. And if you ask why this 
has not been done before the answer is that as a result of the ceasefire in May 1994, 
the parties pledged to resolve the conflict peacefully and to do it with the help of 
mediators - the OSCE Minsk Group. Unfortunately, over all these years, official 
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Yerevan has not shown the political will for the peaceful liberation of at least 1 cm2 
of the occupied land. (para. 4). 
On one hand, such a post illustrated how Azerbaijan had the ability to retake the control 
of land but did not take the actions as the ‘self’ has always been cooperative on the 
ceasefire matter. On the other hand, it made a contrast illustrating the uncooperative 
‘other’, i.e. Armenian, as the main factor of the status quo.  
 
Another example illustrating Azerbaijnais’ belief on the UNSC resolutions could be a 
post posted by Allahverdiyev (2020). A video of a BBC interview with Pashinyan was 
attached in the post. The post highlighted the statement from the interviewer that “what 
we can do is address the reality of today” (para. 1). This post implied that in order to solve 
the deadlocks, the on-going reality of the war should be prioritised. From Azerbaijanis’ 
perspective, following the UNSC resolutions would be the most practical solution to 
resolve the deadlocks. Since Azerbaijan has been the one abiding by the UNSC 





While Armenia was portrayed as the main party of the uncooperative ‘other’, biased third-
party mediators from the West were also considered as a part of the uncooperative ‘other’. 
The othering was mainly applied by the level of officials and think tanks.  
 
During an interview with CNN International (Aliyev, 2020g), Aliyev expressed the 
concern of the qualification of France being a mediator of the conflict when Macron 
publicly stated its support to Armenia in spite of being one of the co-chairs of the OSCE 
Minsk group. Azerbaijan told the world that it would only allow countries who share the 
same value of justice with Azerbaijan to be the potential mediators of this war. As it was 
believed by Aliyev that “It is the countries with a resolution potential, the ones Azerbaijan 
respects for their dignity, justice and sincerity that will be the guarantors of lasting peace” 
(Aliyev, 2020f, para.1). On the other hand, by referring to the statements from the Turkish 
administration, AzerNews (2020g) expressed that double standards were applied by the 
international community. According to AzerNews (2020g), the international community 
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condemned the liberation of lands by Azerbaijanis but encouraged the self-determination 
of Nagorno-Karabakh and labelled it as a liberation struggle of ethnic Armenians. It 
reflected how Azerbaijanis considered the international community being biased on 
solving the issue. 
 
At the level of think tanks, this storyline about the uncooperative ‘other’ was also briefly 
addressed. “However, at the end of the day, the Co-Chairs, probably with the exception 
of Russia, have shown no urgency for resolving the conflict simmering in their 
geopolitical backyard” (AIR Center, 2020c, para. 13). 
 
Threat of Separatism 
 
Another storyline under this narrative is how Azerbaijanis rejected the idea of self-
determination of Nagorno-Karabakh. Besides the belief that Nagorno-Karabakh has 
always been a part of Azerbaijan according to international law, they suggested such self-
determination would encourage separatism, which would be a security threat to the 
international community. 
 
At the level of officials, When being interviewed by media channels such as Sky News 
(Aliyev, 2020f), Aliyev stated clearly that Azerbaijan will not recognise the independence 
of Nagorno-Karabakh as the result of their self-determination. The following is quoted 
from the transcript created by Azertag (2020a) of that interview: 
Being national minority does not mean that you have a right for secession, have a 
right for separatism. Separatism is a big threat to international community and all 
the countries in the world condemn separatism. What has been done against us was 
separatism of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and military aggression of 
Armenia’s state against Azerbaijan which led to the situation which we are facing 
now. (para. 3) 
From this quote, it apparently illustrated two main points. Firstly, Aliyev portrayed this 
brutal war as a result of separatism. Secondly, it illustrated how Aliyev believed the ethnic 
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh did not have rights to self-determination.  
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Moreover, it was believed that the threat of separatism in Nagorno-Karabakh did not only 
lie in the independence of a new state per se. Aliyev suggested once the self-determination 
of people in Nagorno-Karabakh succeeded, it would become the establishment of another 
Armenian state (Aliyev, 2020c). This expressed the concern of Nagorno-Karabakh 
becoming a part of Armenia after the so-called self-determination. This concern from the 
Azerbaijani side was apparent when  AzerNews (2020f) called Harutyunyan  “the ‘leader’ 
of Pashinyan's ruling group in the separatist region” (para. 5). At the same time, according 
to AzerNews (2020f), because of the threat brought by separatism to the world, separatists 
should be warned and punished. “As a result of a precise strike of the Azerbaijani army, 
Harutyunyan was severely wounded. The same will be with other separatists" (para. 2). 
 
Nonetheless, the storyline regarding the threat of separatism was not observed at the level 
of social communities. The Facebook posts mainly addressed how Nagorno-Karabakh 
has been a part of Azerbaijan with international recognition. 
 
Conclusion of the Narrative  
 
In this narrative, this war signified a war on international justice, with the cooperative 
‘self’ fighting for such justice and the uncooperative ‘other’ undermining it. Azerbaijan 
was the cooperative ‘self’ while Armenia and biased third parties were considered to be 
the uncooperative ‘other’. To Azerbaijanis, international justice signified the compliance 
with international law and UNSC resolutions. On the other hand, biased third parties 
signified those who supported the stance of Armenia instead of pursing the international 












This research aimed at understanding the image of the Nagorno-Karabakh war from a 
constructivist perspective. In order to approach this research problem, a discourse 
analysis under the theory of Laclau and Mouffe was conducted. By introducing a 
discourse analysis, we firstly deconstructed the messages from the empirical resources 
we collected. Secondly, we reconstructed them into narratives and presented them in the 
empirical chapters of this research.  
 
There were three narratives from each side presenting their views about this war. These 
were the narratives they attempted to assign as the signified content of this war. In other 
words, this war is a floating signifier, the meaning of which was being contested. From 
the Armenian side, the narratives were 1) Genocide 2.0, 2) Patriotic War and 3) War on 
Western and Christian Values. While from the Azerbaijani side, the narratives were 1) 
Armenian Terrorism, 2) Liberation of ‘Self’ and 3) International Justice. The titles of 
these narratives presented what the war signified to the participants respectively.  
 
Since we conducted the research within Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical framework, we 
believed the meanings and signifiers defined in the discourses participants produced were 
based on how the signified content of the central signifiers were assigned. We assumed 
the central signifiers would be consistent among the narratives constructed for each side 
respectively. As expected, it was observed that both sides have consistent central 
signifiers with consistent signified content. For Armenians, the central signifiers were, 
such as, ‘democracy’ and ‘Christian values’. Other signifiers such as ‘human rights’ were 
defined according to these central signifiers. To Armenians, ‘human rights’ was 
equivalent to the embracement of democratic values and Christian values, which included 
the rights of people to self-determination. On the other hand, for Azerbaijanis, their 
central signifier was mainly ‘international justice’. Their definition of ‘international 
justice’ was the abidance of international law and UNSC resolutions. Thus, their concept 
of ‘human rights’ was also defined according to the definition of ‘international justice’. 
As such, the concept of ‘patriotism’ and ‘liberation’ were also defined and understood 
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differently between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. ‘Patriotism’ and ‘liberation’ to 
Armenians were defined as achieving national unity through the rights to self-
determination3. While to Azerbaijanis, they were defined as protecting territorial integrity 
in compliance with international law. 
 
According to how central signifiers were defined, we could also observe their self-
identification regarding this war in the narratives. All the narratives had clear application 
of otherness.  
 
Overall, Armenians told their part of the story portraying Azerbaijan and Turkey as the 
brutal ‘other’ in the war. It was consistent among the three narratives we presented in this 
paper. Particularly, in the narrative about genocide 2.0, they suggested Azerbaijan was 
politically under the control of the Turkish government. While for the Armenian ‘self’, 
they told the story of it being the victim of this war. To Armenians, their collective ‘self’ 
had a traumatised past which was repeated by the brutality of Turkey and Azerbaijan. Yet, 
they also emphasised this ‘self’ was strong in the war, united and being the protector of 
the world. For Azerbaijanis, Armenians were the main ‘other’ in their narratives. 
According to them, Armenians were brutal against Azerbaijanis and uncooperative on the 
ceasefire matter. The Azerbaijani ‘self’ was the victim of the brutality. The ‘self’ was 
being misunderstood by the world also because of the disinformation strategy conducted 
by the brutal Armenians. Besides, the ‘self’ was oppressed and should be liberated. The 
‘self’ was cooperative on the ceasefire matter and was fighting for international justice. 
 
It is especially noticeable among the social communities from both sides that they told 
the world they were the victims of brutality. At the same time, they suggested the 
indifference and ignorance of the international community intensified the situation. 
 
3 While the name ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’ was used throughout the entire analysis for a consistent flow, it is important 
to note that ‘Artsakh’ was used most of the time by the Armenian side among all the levels of participants when 
they described the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Officials, think tanks and the social communities were often all 
consistently adopting the name ‘Artskah’. On one hand, it illustrated Armenians’ affirmation of the rights to self-
determination and the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. On the other hand, it told the world that Nagorno-
Karabakh had a different meaning to Armenians than what it meant to Azerbaijanis. It also showed the dispersed 
social realities Armenians and Azerbaijanis were portraying and consuming in their discourses. 
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However, the otherness of the international community and the world in general were 
different between the narratives of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Among Armenians, the 
world was a part of the ‘self’ when the ‘self’ signified the embracement of Western and 
Christian values. But this ‘self’ was also internally split when the international 
community failed to act upon the values they promised in their policies. Among 
Azerbaijanis, we observed their othering of the international community in the narrative 
about liberation of the ‘self’. There was a storyline about the world being a part of the 
‘other’ who oppressed the ‘self’. Within the same storyline, the ‘self’ was also associated 
to Muslims. They told the world how the Muslim ‘self’ had been oppressed by the non-
Muslim ‘other’ in general. 
 
As such, among the narratives from both sides, we could observe similarities of the 
signified content of the ‘international community’. For both sides, the ‘international 
community’ was indifferent to the conflict. Besides, from the religious othering they 
applied in their narratives, we could possibly tell that the ‘international community’ was 
associated with Christianity and democratic values. Thus, to Armenians, the 
‘international community’ was considered as a part of the ‘self’ regardless of the internal 
split described in their storyline. While for Azerbaijanis, they considered the 
‘international community’ as a part of the oppressing ‘other’ who oppressed the Muslim 
‘self’.  
 
All these six narratives constitute the image of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. The war itself, 
as a floating signifier, was defined and assigned the signified content by Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis respectively, according to their different beliefs and political interests. These 
six narratives clearly illustrate the rivalry between the two sides with the application of 
otherness observed from both sides. The narratives represent the image of the war in our 
meaningful world. In other words, these six narratives are what we understand about this 








Firstly, it is the problem of credibility. The author’s understanding of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and the war in 2020 could be biased. The biased understanding could 
affect the credibility of this research. Besides, even though social practices and political 
institutions were not a part of the consideration when studying the image of war that 
participants presented to the world, there could be a problem of credibility of empirical 
data collected. Such credibility could be in question when political freedom, such as 
freedom of speech of the countries were not taken into consideration during the research. 
To what extent political institutions played a role in influencing the discourses would be 
raised and addressed by Critical Discourse analysts. In other words, this research, without 
the critical analysis, could hardly tell us whether the discourses observed from different 
levels of participants were limited by their political institutions and their social practices. 
 
Secondly, the reliability of this research could be lowered by the author’s analysis of 
empirical data within the framework applied in this research. Due to the author’s limited 
capability in conducting a discourse analysis through a systematic and organised structure, 
the method of interpreting empirical texts and images in this research might have left 
some significant messages and meanings omitted.  
 
6.3 Further Research  
 
This research mainly focused on the image of war, i.e. what the war signified in our 
meaningful world. This research did not study the social practices, norms and political 
institutions which could possibly impact the discourses from both parties. Because of that, 
further research conducted within Fairclough’s framework of CDA would be helpful as 
it allows researchers to delve deeper into both the historical and social context of the 
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